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A growing body of work has examined responses to moral dilemmas where causing some 
degree of harm leads to a greater positive outcome; such dilemmas are said to pit 
deontological philosophical considerations (causing harm is never acceptable) against 
utilitarian philosophical considerations (causing harm is acceptable if it leads to the best 
possible outcome). According to dual-process theories of moral judgment, independent 
processes drive each judgment:  affective reactions to harm drive deontological 
judgments, whereas cognitive evaluations of outcomes drive utilitarian judgments. Yet, 
theoretically both processes contribute to each judgment; therefore, it is an error to equate 
judgments with processes. To overcome this error, we adapted Jacoby‘s (1991) process 
dissociation (PD) procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and 
utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Five studies presented in two articles support 
the conclusion that process dissociation taps the processes theorized to underlie moral 
judgments more effectively than overt dilemma judgments, and allows for increased 
insight into the nature of moral processing. In Conway and Gawronski (2013) Study 1, 
the PD parameters predicted theoretically relevant individual-difference variables (e.g., 
the utilitarian parameter uniquely predicted cognitive load, whereas the deontology 
parameter uniquely predicted empathic concern and perspective-taking). Moreover, both 
parameters predicted moral identity—a relation that was obscured using overt moral 
judgments. In Study 2, a cognitive load manipulation selectively reduced utilitarian 
inclinations, whereas in Study 3, a manipulation that increased the vividness of harm 
selectively increased the deontology parameter. Together, these findings suggest that the 
deontology parameter is tapping affective reactions to harm, and the utilitarian parameter 
is tapping cognitive evaluations of outcomes (consistent with theory). In Study 1 of 
Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro (under review), participants scoring higher in 
Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and meaninglessness made more overt utilitarian 
judgments (replicating past findings), but process dissociation revealed that this relation 
was due to decreased deontology rather than increased utilitarianism among people high 
in antisocial personality traits. Study 2 demonstrated that the deontology and utilitarian 
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parameters each correlated with different kinds of prosociality. These findings clarify 
theoretical confusion regarding the nature of utilitarianism and deontology.  
Keywords 
Morality, judgments and decision-making, process dissociation, emotion, affect, 
cognition, psychopathy, prosocial behavior, moral dilemmas, prosociality, ethics,  
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PROCESS DISSOCIATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT 1 
Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Imagine that a vicious army commander captures your party as you travel through a 
remote region. If you kill one member of your party, this commander will allow the 
rest to go free; otherwise, he will kill everyone. Should you kill a member of your 
party to secure freedom for the rest? Or imagine you are a doctor performing surgery 
on a person with a rare blood type. If you kill this person and share their blood with 
other patients, you could save five lives. Should you kill this person in order to save 
the others? Or imagine you are captain of a capsized vessel and are now in an 
overcrowded lifeboat that is slowing sinking. If you push a grievously wounded 
person overboard, the rest of the people in the lifeboat will be safe; otherwise, 
everyone will drown. Should you push this person overboard in order to save the rest?  
In essence, these questions entail causing some degree of harm in order to achieve a 
greater positive outcome. Philosophers have pondered such questions for hundreds of 
years, arguing over which actions are normatively correct (see Kagan, 1998). Some 
have argued that the morality of actions is defined by their nature rather than their 
consequences: some actions are intrinsically wrong and can never be right no matter 
what outcomes occur (e.g., Kant, 1785/1959). This perspective is called deontology, 
which means duty or obligation in Greek, and deontological ethical perspectives treat 
moral rules (such as do no harm) as absolutes that people are duty-bound to follow. 
According to deontology, causing harm is morally incorrect even in service of the 
best outcome, for doing so treats human beings as a means to an end, rather than an 
end in themselves. Kant argued that treatment as a mere means to someone else‘s end 
is fundamentally degrading; therefore, causing harm is morally unacceptable 
regardless of outcomes.   
Others have argued that harm dealt in the process of helping many others is morally 
permissible—nay, morally mandated—because the morality of an action should be 
judged according to the consequences that action produces (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998). 
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These perspectives are generally referred to as consequentialist ethical positions, as 
they are focused on the consequences of actions, but the best-known variety is 
utilitarianism, which mandates acting in ways that maximize overall utility (i.e., well-
being) for all parties concerned (Kagan, 1998). According to utilitarian perspectives, 
actions that produce net positive outcomes are morally acceptable and mandated, 
even if action results in harm (provided that more utility is gained than lost by 
harmful action).  
Both deontology and utilitarianism are described as moral principles. Defining 
morality is incredibly difficult given the vast scope of the construct, so I will present 
several recent definitions in an effort to be thorough.  In a review chapter, Krebs 
(2008) defined morality as a ―mental phenomenon that consists in thoughts and 
feelings about rights and duties, good and bad character traits (virtues and vices), and 
right and wrong motives and behaviors‖ (p. 150). In another review chapter, Haidt 
and Kesebir (2010) expanded this definition to consider elements of morality outside 
of psychological perception: ―Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, 
norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological 
mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make 
cooperative social life possible‖ (p. 800). In yet another review, Skitka, Bauman, and 
Mullen (2008) noted that morality entails perceptions of universality (everyone must 
agree that a judgment is morally correct; disagreement is taken as evidence of 
immoral character), objectivity (moral judgments are perceived as objectively true 
similar to factual information about the world, such as 2 + 2 = 4), and authority 
independence (moral rules do not depend on authority; if an authority acts against 
moral rules this abrogates their authority rather than the rules). Moreover, morality 
entails a motivational component: upon making a moral judgment, people feel 
compelled to act on their judgment, lest they view themselves as a hypocrite (Skitka, 
Bauman, and Mullen (2008). Finally, morality is linked to identity and self-
perceptions, although there is variance in the degree to which morality is central to 
the self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Bergman, 2002). 
Thus, both deontology and utilitarianism theoretically qualify as genuinely moral 
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insofar as they entail a concern with others‘ wellbeing, which the various definitions 
agree is a key element of morality. 
1.1 The Original Trolley Dilemma  
In most real-world situations, deontological and utilitarian ethics lead to the same 
judgment. Actions such as theft, lying (for selfish gain), and murder violate both the 
deontological principle to avoid harm and the utilitarian ideal of maximizing overall 
outcomes (except in rare cases, such as stealing something to save a life). Therefore, 
following either ethical perspective ought to lead to morally acceptable conduct in 
most situations—which means that moral conduct in most situations remains 
uninformative regarding which moral principle actors ascribe to. Yet, it is possible to 
imagine rare circumstances where deontological and utilitarian perspectives conflict. 
Philosopher Philippa Foot (1967) introduced one such scenario as a thought 
experiment:  
―He is the driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer from one 
narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one 
man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed... 
The question is why we should say, without hesitation, that the driver 
should steer for the less occupied track….‖ (p. 8-9).  
Foot was contrasting this trolley example with that of a corrupt magistrate who 
frames an innocent man in order to stop a riot, and she argued that the former is 
acceptable whereas the latter is not due to the doctrine of double effect, whereby a 
harmful action ought to be viewed differently depending on whether harm was dealt 
in order to achieve a positive outcome versus harm dealt as a side effect of another 
action aimed at achieving a positive outcome (Aquinas, 1265-1272/1947). She argued 
that harm in the trolley case is acceptable, as the harm will only occur as a side-effect 
of acting to maximize outcomes (i.e., changing the path of the train). Conversely, in 
the case of the magistrate, harm to the framed innocent is the mechanism through 
which outcomes are to be maximized. Therefore, Foot argued that this kind of harm is 
unacceptable.  
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Foot‘s distinction is interesting, but subsequent work has not examined this 
distinction in detail (cf., Manfrinati, Lotto, Sarlo, Palomba & Rumiati, 2013). Rather, 
Foot‘s trolley problem (or tram problem, as she may have viewed it) became widely 
known because it illustrates a rare tension between deontological and utilitarian 
ethical positions. Essentially, the trolley problem asks whether is it morally 
acceptable to kill one person (or knowingly allow one person to be killed) in order to 
save five people. According to deontological ethical positions, the morally correct 
answer is no—dealing harm is unacceptable even though it will save lives, because 
this harm treats the one person as a means to the ends of the other people; treating 
people as means to an end is fundamentally degrading. People have a moral duty to 
treat one another as ends in themselves (Kant, 1785/1959). According to utilitarian 
ethical positions, the morally correct answer is yes—in this case, causing harm is a 
lesser evil that must occur in order to achieve the greater good, and is therefore both 
morally permissible and morally mandated (Mill, 1861/1998). As the good achieved 
by the action (five lives saved) is greater than the evil achieved (one life ended) this 
action is considered morally correct by utilitarian standards. Therefore, utilitarianism 
and deontology mandate different actions in moral situations where causing harm in 
necessary in order to achieve the greater good.  
For over a decade now, psychologists, neuroscientists, and other researchers have 
moved beyond thought experiments to examine the empirical distribution of lay 
judgments on such moral problems, particularly following Greene and colleagues‘ 
landmark publication in Science (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001). Whereas philosophers had been largely content to speculate regarding how 
people should answer such dilemmas, researchers began to administer trolley-type 
moral dilemmas to various populations and examined the empirical distribution of 
how people actually answer moral dilemmas, in an effort to improve understanding 
of human moral psychology (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Carney & Mason, 2010; Côté, Piff, 
& Willer, 2013; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di 
Pellegrino 2007; Fumagalli et al., 2010; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 
2004; Hofmann & Baumert, 2010; Koenigs et al., 2007; Manfrinati et al., 2013; 
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Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Nichols, 2002; 
Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Pellizzoni, Siegal, & Surian, 2010; Petrinovich & O‘Neill, 
1996; Petrinovich, O‘Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). 
Although researchers have debated the normative implications of empirical findings 
in this domain (e.g., Baron, 2000; Baron & Spranca, 1997; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; 
Bazerman & Greene, 2010; Benis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010; Greene, 2003; Sunstein, 
2005), most of the debate has shifted away from normative discussion to discussion 
of mechanism: what are the psychological processes that motivate judgments that 
harm is acceptable or not acceptable on such dilemmas? We will return to this 
discussion momentarily, but first let‘s consider the broader picture regarding why 
scientists were examining responses to moral dilemmas in the first place.  
1.2 Theoretical Backdrop: Moral Cognition and Emotion  
As previously mentioned, cases where deontology and utilitarianism conflict are rare 
indeed: how often does one have an opportunity to save several lives, let alone 
sacrifice another life in order to do so? Indeed, from an outside perspective, it might 
seem odd that scientists study the question at all—for the aim of this research is not to 
give people practical advice on whether or not to sacrifice another person under 
particular circumstances. Rather, this question is of interest because it provides 
evidence regarding the fundamental nature of human moral psychology as a whole—
a field that was undergoing a Kuhnian (1989) revolution when Greene and 
colleagues‘ (2001) paper was published.  
Since its inception, the field of moral psychology had been dominated by the 
theorizing of two influential 20
th
 Century scholars: Jean Piaget and Lawrence 
Kohlberg. Piaget (1932/1965) described the ontogenetic development of children‘s 
thinking in terms of logic structures: he argued that children advance in intelligence 
by integrating successively more abstract information into coherent concepts across 
hierarchical stages of development. Piaget argued that children begin life without 
moral concepts, and then develop first heteronomous moral reasoning (moral rules are 
those enforced by authority) and then autonomous moral reasoning (moral rules are 
negotiated fairly between equals). Kohlberg (e.g., 1969) expanded Piaget‘s model to 
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encompass six reasoning stages of moral reasoning (for a review, see Kohlberg & 
Hersh, 1977).  
Moral reasoning is ―conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given 
information about people in order to reach a moral judgment‖ (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). 
In other words, moral reasoning is at least partially intentional, effortful, controllable, 
and occurs within the conscious awareness of the reasoner (Bargh, 1994), and 
involves sequential steps (Galotti, 1989) of constructing and testing hypotheses 
(Turiel, 1983) by searching for and weighing evidence (Kuhn, 1989) pertaining to 
harm, justice, fairness, motives, and other aspects of the situation. Accordingly, 
Kohlberg measured reasoning by coding the breadth and sophistication of 
participants‘ verbal responses to various ethical quandaries (e.g., should a man steal a 
drug to save his wife’s/friend’s/a stranger’s life?). He argued that increasing 
sophistication in the quality of one‘s moral reasoning is both the empirical cause of 
moral judgments and behavior, as well as the normative, teleological goal of 
ontogenetic development (Kohlberg, 1971).  
According to Kohlberg, morality is inherently rational: to know the good is to do the 
good. No individual can claim moral knowledge without the simultaneous realization 
that this knowledge requires them to act morally—because moral principles are 
universal and prescriptive categorical imperatives that demand action (Kohlberg & 
Candee, 1984). Indeed, moral imperatives are more than just strong attitudes (see 
Krosnick & Petty, 1995), they are experienced as factually correct beliefs about the 
world (Shweder, 2002) that ought to be universally adopted (Turiel, 1983), and they 
provide both motivation and justification for action (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 
2005). Therefore, Kohlberg argued that the primary reason people fail to engage in 
moral behavior is because they have failed to engage in (sufficiently developed) 
moral reasoning. Kohlberg dismissed ―irrational emotive theories‖ as exogenous to 
human morality (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 188). Emotions are neither moral nor immoral, 
he argued, since they can be channeled toward either moral or immoral ends. The 
channeling processes themselves are cognitive reasoning structures based upon 
rational, verbal thought. This view aligns with a rich intellectual tradition including 
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Immanuel Kant (1785/1959), and Plato (1949), who were skeptical that ‗the passions‘ 
should be considered part of human morality.  
Kohlberg‘s perspective proved so popular that it went on to define an entire 
generation of psychological research, called cognitive developmentalism (see Blasi, 
1980, and Lapsley, 1996, for reviews). Although cognitive developmental scholars 
critiqued Kohlberg in numerous ways, nonetheless they unanimously agreed with 
Kohlberg‘s central premise that reasoning drives moral judgment. For example, 
Gilligan (1982) argued for expanding the moral domain to include a more ‗feminine‘ 
ethic of caring alongside the ‗masculine‘ ethic of justice. However, she utilized the 
Kohlbergian moral judgment interviews to argue her case. Likewise, Turiel (1983) 
borrowed Kohlberg's methodology even as he demonstrated that participants 
distinguish the moral domain from social convention and personal preferences. Rest 
(1986) argued that Kohlberg's cognitively deterministic model oversimplified the 
complex process of moral action, and that other factors (including empathy) ought to 
be considered. He argued to incorporate the work of Hoffman (1982), who 
emphasized the role that moral emotions play in moral judgments, with that of 
Kohlberg. Nonetheless, Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test focused primarily on the 
same rational decision-making processes that Kohlberg's stages did (Bergman, 2002). 
Even Blasi, who argued that moral reasoning fails to motivate moral behavior unless 
the self is involved, still believed that only reasoning allows for integrating morality 
into identity, since it requires "personal effort to sift various opinions" (Blasi, 1995). 
Thus, Blasi accepted the role of rationality in making moral judgments, regardless of 
the import of the self in moral action. In sum, despite decades of progress and 
numerous challenges, the field of moral psychology was dominated by rationalist 
models of judgment right up into the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, this state of affairs would 
not last.  
At the turn of the new millennium, Haidt (2001) published a landmark paper calling 
into question the assertion that moral reasoning drives (most) moral judgments. 
Instead, Haidt argued that moral judgments are the product of moral intuitions: ―the 
sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective 
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valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion‖ (Haidt, 
2001, p. 817). Haidt argued that intuitions are distinct from reasoning in that intuitive 
judgments occur quickly and effortlessly, in a one-shot process that occurs largely, if 
not entirely, outside of conscious awareness (Bargh, 1994). Whereas the judgment 
itself may enter into conscious awareness, the process of arriving at that judgment 
does not. Moreover, Haidt argued, moral reasoning (often) operates post hoc—
reasoning simply justifies the judgment caused by intuitions, like a lawyer defending 
her client‘s position regardless of why her client is in the legal system.  
Haidt did allow that moral reasoning may sometimes directly influence judgments, 
but he argued this would occur infrequently (others are more optimistic about the 
influence of reason on intuition, see Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; cf. Haidt, 2003b). 
Rather, he argued that the primary purpose of moral reasoning is social—to 
communicate one‘s moral judgments to others in ways that hopefully evoke the same 
intuitions in them, thereby achieving social consensus regarding moral judgments 
(although this process may also result in deadlocked arguments between opposing 
moral camps, such as in the abortion debate, Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This 
argument places Haidt in a venerable intellectual tradition including Aristotle (1962) 
and David Hume, who said that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" 
(1739/1969, p. 462).  
The social intuitionist model posed a serious challenge to rationalist models of moral 
psychology, in part because it resonated with a host of findings casting doubt on the 
predominance of rational thinking overall. Evidence suggests that people are often 
unaware of the causes of their behaviour (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) as much 
processing takes place below the threshold of conscious awareness (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). As cognitive misers, humans often engage in heuristic processing 
unless there is need for more systematic processing (Chaiken, 1987). Once people 
have arrived at an initial conclusion, they tend to reinforce it by seeking confirmatory 
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evidence (Kunda, 1990)—particularly when motivated to do so, as when defending a 
moral position (Kuhn, 1989).  
People make affect-laden judgments of facial (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and verbal 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996) stimuli within 250 milliseconds of 
subliminal presentation. People also categorize others into morally valanced 
stereotypes within milliseconds (see Devine, 1989). People rely on affective 
information when making justice judgments (Van den Bos, 2003). Luo and 
colleagues (2006) found negative evaluations of immoral stimuli on an implicit 
association test were associated with activation in affective brain areas. In addition, 
the motivational force of moral judgments is mediated by emotion (Mullen & Skitka, 
2006). The particular moral emotion experienced may depend on which domain of 
morality has been violated (e.g., harm vs. purity violations may elicit more anger vs. 
disgust, Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012). That 
said, it may not always be necessary to hone in on the exact moral emotion in play, as 
the moral emotions of anger and disgust are positively correlated, and interact to 
predict moral judgments (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013, cf., Russel & Giner-Sorolla, 
2011).  
Setting aside questions regarding specific emotional states, evidence suggests that 
when people encounter a morally charged stimulus, they experience affective 
reactions that predict their moral judgments better than do their rational arguments 
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993)—unless they actively suppress their emotional response 
in order to avoid the behavioral implications of moral emotions (Cameron & Payne, 
2011). Accordingly, the experience of affective states increases the intensity of moral 
judgments (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). Merely simulating actions that would 
cause harm elicits visceral, physiological reactions, especially for people higher in 
threat reactivity (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012). Participants view moral 
judgments regarding intentional harm as universal in scope and independent of 
authority wishes (Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009). Moreover, moral emotions (not 
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reasoning or identification) carry the motivational force in moral judgments (Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). 
Moreover, individual differences in the propensity to experience moral affect predict 
guilt and reactions to injustice (Hofmann & Baumert, 2010), and individual 
differences in sensitivity to disgust predict a wide variety of moral judgments and 
behavior, including disapproval of gay people (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 
2009), moral attitudes regarding animal welfare (Herzog & Golden, 2009), 
condemnation of unusual sexual behaviour (Haidt & Hersh, 2001), and even 
perception of morally relevant perceptual stimuli (Sherman & Clore, 2009).  
Experimentally inducing disgust increases the severity of moral judgments (Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).  This effect does not require awareness of the link 
between disgust and moral judgments—Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found that 
participants were more likely to judge actions as morally incorrect when disgust was 
hypnotically induced versus a control group. In fact, disgust induction was so 
effective in this study that one third of participants rated a neutral story as somewhat 
morally wrong even though they could not verbalize a reason for doing so.  
But perhaps the most striking evidence for the social intuitionist model comes from a 
study conducted by Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993). They constructed stories in which 
the protagonists behaved offensively, but failed to cause any real harm. Participants' 
reactions to these stories of incest, having sex with a chicken, or eating one's pet dog 
tended to be strongly negative; most participants immediately and adamantly asserted 
that such actions were morally wrong—yet they struggled to find rational reasons 
why they believed so. Haidt and colleagues coined the term moral dumbfounding to 
describe this perplexing state of affairs. If moral judgments really are the product of 
moral reasoning, and reasoning is at least partially conscious, then participants ought 
to be able to articulate the reasons behind their judgment. Findings such as those of 
Haidt et al. (1993) led some theorists to even claim that ―emotions are not merely 
correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and 
sufficient‖ (Prinz, 2006, p. 29). Yet, the social intuitionist model has also faced 
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criticism (e.g., Narvaez, 2008; Monin, Beer, & Pizarro, 2007; Saltzstein, & 
Kasachkoff, 2004). 
In sum, Haidt‘s (2001) social intuitionist model challenged older rationalist models of 
moral psychology by proposing that moral judgments primarily result from fast, 
visceral, affective moral intuitions, and that moral reasoning primarily operates as 
post-hoc justification. This position stood in stark contrast to the Kohlbergian (e.g., 
1971) view that morality stems only from rational processes. Hence, the field was 
characterized by two fairly extreme and largely incompatible perspectives that 
disagreed over the primacy of affect versus cognition. Each perspective labeled one 
process as primary and the other secondary. The field was mired in dissention, until a 
new paradigm emerged, allowing researchers to pose new questions regarding human 
moral psychology.   
1.3 The Emergence of the Moral Dilemma Paradigm 
In the same year that Haidt published his influential social intuitionist model, another 
group of scholars led by Joshua Greene published what became a landmark paper in 
Science (Greene et al., 2001). They argued that neither cognition nor visceral, affect-
laden constructs were primary in moral psychology; rather, each process motivates 
different kinds of moral judgments. Specifically, affect-laden processes motivate 
moral judgments to avoid causing harm, whereas deliberative reasoning motivates 
moral judgments to maximize welfare.
1
 In contrast to other theoretical positions (i.e, 
Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1971), this distinction provided a framework wherein both 
affect-laden processes and rational deliberation may causally impact moral decision-
making. Indeed, Greene and colleagues claimed their model ―allows us to steer a 
middle course between traditional rationalism and more recent emotivism that have 
dominated moral psychology‖ (2001, p. 2107).  
According to Greene and colleagues‘ model, when faced with a moral quandary 
where one person must be hurt in order to aid a number of others, people immediately 
and involuntarily experience a negative, affect-laden reaction to the prospect of 
causing harm.  If this affective reaction is sufficiently powerful, or in the absence of 
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sufficient time, motivation and resources to engage in deliberation, it will dominate 
the decision-making process, resulting in a judgment that harm is morally 
unacceptable (consistent with deontological ethical positions).  Under more generous 
processing conditions that allow for complex cognition, people may also engage in 
cognitive deliberation regarding the costs and benefits of harming another person.  
Given sufficient time, motivation, and resources, cognition will dominate decision-
making, resulting in a judgment that harm is morally acceptable (consistent with 
utilitarian ethical positions).
2
 Thus, Greene and colleagues proposed that the 
psychological processes underlying deontological and utilitarian moral decisions are 
distinct and potentially independent, making conflict possible. Greene argued this 
dual-process model parallels dual-process models in other domains, such as 
stereotyping (Devine, 1989).  
Like all good models, the dual-process model of moral judgments suggests novel, 
testable hypotheses regarding the conditions where one process will predominate over 
the other. Contexts where moral stimuli elicit strong affective reactions or where 
deliberation is difficult—such as physical proximity to the victim or time pressure—
should promote judgments based on visceral, affective, or heuristic processes, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of judging harm unacceptable (consistent with deontological 
ethical positions). Conversely, in situations that fail to evoke strong affect, or that are 
conducive to deliberation—such as physical distance from the victim or time to 
deliberate—people should be more likely to cognitively evaluate outcomes, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of making judgments that harm is acceptable (consistent 
with utilitarian ethical positions). Moreover, individual differences in cognitive 
abilities, such as working memory capacity, should be associated with more 
utilitarian judgments, whereas individual differences in affective tendencies (e.g., 
empathic concern) should be associated with more deontological judgments.  
Greene and colleagues (2001) provided initial evidence for the theory using both self-
reports and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data obtained by posing 
moral dilemmas to participants in a scanner. Like Foot (1967), Greene contrasted 
different dilemmas to make his point. Unlike Foot, however, Greene did not focus on 
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the doctrine of double effect (the distinction between achieving positive outcomes via 
harmful actions directly, versus achieving positive outcomes via methods that cause 
harm as an incidental byproduct of action).
3
 Instead, Greene followed philosopher 
Thompson (1986) by contrasting responses on dilemmas where harmful actions are 
completed through a technical intermediary, such as pushing a button to make a train 
change direction, which he called impersonal dilemmas, with similar dilemmas where 
harm is applied through direct contact with the victim, which he called personal 
dilemmas (although subsequent researchers have typically renamed this variant high-
conflict dilemmas, e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007, or incongruent dilemmas, e.g., Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013). For comparison, Greene and colleagues also examined 
nonmoral dilemmas, such as choosing whether to travel by bus or train, but we will 
focus discussion on the personal-impersonal distinction.  
Greene‘s version of the impersonal trolley dilemma reads as follows:  
―A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it 
proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a 
switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it 
will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in 
order to save five people at the expense of one?‖ (Greene et al., 2001, 
p. 2105).  
Conversely, Greene‘s version of the personal footbridge dilemma reads:  
―As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing 
next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in 
between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the 
only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, 
onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop 
the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others 
by pushing this stranger to his death?‖ (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2105). 
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Greene and colleagues asked participants whether causing harm was acceptable or 
not acceptable in each case. On personal dilemmas similar to the footbridge dilemma, 
most people (~80%) selected the deontological option (i.e., harm is not acceptable). 
Conversely, on impersonal dilemmas similar to the trolley dilemma, most people 
(~80%) selected the utilitarian option (i.e., harm is acceptable). This basic pattern has 
now been replicated many times (e.g., Greene et al., 2004, Carney & Mason, 2010), 
and even emerges for children as young as three (Pellizzoni et al., 2010).  
Greene and colleagues argued that both personal and impersonal dilemmas pit 
deontological considerations against utilitarian ones, but these dilemma variants differ 
to the extent that they elicit affective reactions to harm. On personal dilemmas, 
participants must contemplate harm they cause directly, thereby enhancing the 
salience of that harm and the visceral, emotion-laden reaction against causing it. On 
impersonal dilemmas, harm is mediated by technical devices and therefore less 
salient—purportedly reducing the strength of affective reactions, and allowing 
cognition to shine through. As Greene and colleagues (2001) put it, ―The thought of 
pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally salient than the 
thought of hitting a switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences, 
and it is this emotional response that accounts for people‘s tendency to treat these 
cases differently‖ (p. 2106). 
Subsequent work clarified that the feature of personal dilemmas that promotes 
affective responses is personal force: intentionally using one‘s physical strength to 
directly cause harm (as in pushing someone off a bridge, Greene et al., 2009). Hence, 
pushing someone off a bridge with a long pole typically engenders responses that 
harm is not acceptable (as the force originates in one‘s muscles), whereas pressing a 
button to have a person fall through a trap door directly in front of you typically 
engenders responses that harm is acceptable (as the force of one‘s muscles is 
transformed via mechanical action). Therefore, it appears that using personal force to 
intentionally harm another person elicits stronger reactions than using mechanical 
intermediaries to cause harm. Yet, other research has demonstrated that a variety of 
techniques are effective at increasing judgments that harm is unacceptable, such as 
              PROCESS DISSOCIATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT 15 
  
visualizing harm more vividly, responding to dilemmas written in an emotionally 
evocative manner, or responding to dilemmas accompanied by visual depictions of 
the victim (Amit & Greene, 2012; Bartels, 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013). These 
findings suggest that personal force is but one of many manners in which the 
emotional salience of causing harm may be highlighted.  
In addition to self-report data on whether participants viewed harm as acceptable or 
unacceptable, Greene and colleagues also examined patterns of activation in various 
brain regions via fMRI.
4
 They found that emotion centers in the brain, such as the 
medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and bilateral superior temporal sulcus, 
evinced greater activation when participants considered personal compared to 
impersonal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001).  A replication by Greene and 
colleagues (2004) found activation in most of the same brain regions, but added the 
amygdala to the list of brain regions activated when participants considered personal 
dilemmas. Moreover, Greene and colleagues (2004) examined activation patterns 
when participants made deontological judgments that harm is not acceptable—largely 
the same regions demonstrated activation.  
Greene and colleagues also found that when participants considered impersonal rather 
than personal dilemmas, there was greater activation in brain regions linked to 
abstract reasoning, working memory, and conflict resolution, such as the right dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobes (Greene et al., 2001), as well as the 
anterior cingulate cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex (Greene et al., 2004).  
These same regions show increased activation when participants made utilitarian 
judgments (i.e., judged harm as acceptable on a dilemma). They argued that these 
findings provided initial evidence in support of the dual-process model where 
affective reactions to harm drive deontological judgments and cognitive evaluations 
of outcomes drive utilitarian judgments.  
1.4 The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology 
Haidt (2007) hailed Greene and colleagues‘ insight regarding the role of affect and 
cognition in morality as part of The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology—a synthesis 
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that incorporates insights from neuroscience (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 
2003), evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1874/1998), primatology (de Waal, 1996), and 
social psychology (e.g, Zajonc, 1980) to clarify current understanding of the nature of 
human moral psychology. Haidt argued the new synthesis suggests:  
―People are self-interested, but they also care about how they (and 
others) treat people, and how they (and others) participate in groups. 
These moral motives are implemented in large part by a variety of 
affect-laden intuitions that arise quickly and automatically and then 
influence controlled processes such as moral reasoning. Moral 
reasoning can correct and override moral intuition, though it is more 
commonly performed in the service of social goals as people navigate 
their gossipy worlds‖ (Haidt, 2007, p. 1001).  
Although reasoning is part of the equation here, the new synthesis does not include 
the intellectual traditions of Kohlbergian moral stage typology (see Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010). Instead, the modern view of moral cognition centers on the concept of 
weighing the costs and benefits of action—i.e., utilitarian tradeoffs—rather than a 
stage-structure of moral reasoning. Haidt argued that moral dilemma research 
resolves the tension between intuitive and rational approaches to moral psychology 
by delineating how and when each process impacts moral judgments.  
1.4.1 Evolutionary Theory and the Dual Process Model  
Although not designed to test evolutionary claims, the dual-process model of moral 
psychology is consistent with modern evolutionary theory.  Greene and Haidt (2002) 
argued that affective reactions to harm may stem from evolutionarily ancient 
psychological mechanisms designed to inhibit aggression and promote prosociality 
among social species, so that they may reap the benefits of cooperation. They also 
argued that cognitive evaluations of outcomes, as a deliberative process, are tied to 
language and domain-general abstract reasoning, and are therefore likely more 
evolutionarily recent. Yet, the uniquely human capacity to reason linguistically may 
have facilitated negotiation between social entities on a more abstract scale, allowing 
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for wide-scale social cooperation orders of magnitude more complex than other social 
species. 
Similar arguments have been made by theorists delineating an evolutionary account 
of human morality. As morality generally entails acting in ways that promote the 
welfare and wellbeing of others, typically at some personal cost, it might seem 
antithetical to evolutionary principles. Paradoxically, however, moral behaviors may 
have increased the inclusive fitness of individuals who performed them—at least 
under certain conditions. According to Trivers‘ (1971) theory of reciprocal altruism, 
altruistic behaviors will be selected for when (1) the cost to the actor is smaller than 
the benefit to the recipient, and (2) there is a high probability that the favor will be 
returned. Because both interaction partners suffer small costs relative to benefits they 
receive, both profit from a net fitness increase. Total costs subtracted from total 
benefits net a sum larger than zero, leading theorists to term such interactions non-
zero-sum (Wright, 1994).  
Although Trivers envisioned reciprocal altruism as a one-on-one interaction, non-
zero-sum fitness benefits increase as reciprocity relationships expand to encompass a 
cooperative group (Wright, 1994). Members of such groups incur small fitness costs 
(i.e. act morally) in order to provide larger fitness benefits to other group members. 
They, in turn, benefit from the sacrifices of other group members. The system 
operates as one of indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1989), which Darwin (1871) 
termed the ‗foundation-stone‘ of morality. The indirect reciprocity model meshes 
well with empirical data on the environment of human evolution. For the last several 
million years, humans lived together in small, highly interdependent, stable hunter-
gatherer groups (Lee & Devore, 1968). These groups meet all the theoretical 
conditions required to make systems of indirect reciprocity increase fitness 
(Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitiyama, 1994). Moreover, under these conditions, group 
selection processes (Sober & Wilson, 2001) as well as sexual selection pressures 
(Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Miller, 2007) may all contribute to the selection of 
psychological mechanisms that motivate prosocial behavior. Krebs (2008) pointed out 
that once selection pressure existed to act in prosocial ways, it might lead to cases of 
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genuine, genetic altruism—heroic sacrifice of one‘s individual genetic fitness for 
greater good in a way that does not indirectly foster genetic fitness—so long as on 
average those mechanisms served to increase inclusive fitness. Hence, ―in 
evolutionary theory, a moral person is simply one who pursues their ultimate genetic 
self-interest through psychological adaptations that embody a genuine, proximate 
concern for others‖ (Miller, 2007, p. 103).   
Accordingly, people have a tendency to cooperate in single-round prisoners dilemmas 
even when it is logically advantageous to cheat (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998) and are 
willing to punish a cheater who hurt someone else, even at personal cost (Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). These costly behaviors only make sense if heuristically 
cooperating contributes to the fabric of the social group, thereby indirectly increasing 
fitness outcomes for oneself through maintaining cooperative norms. In reciprocal 
exchange, strategies such as tit-for-tat that cooperate with other altruists but defect 
with other cheaters, are evolutionarily stable and capable of invading populations 
comprised of either undifferentiating co-operators or cheaters (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981). However, it also makes sense to heuristically reject those who fail to 
cooperate; this simple strategy (with a few modifications) of cooperating with others 
unless they fail to uphold their end of the bargain (i.e., punishing free-riders) is 
capable of becoming evolutionarily stable when pitted against other strategies in 
computer simulations (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1964). Gintis et al, (2004) demonstrated 
that so long as humans in cooperative systems were able to track others‘ reputations 
and sanction one another cooperative systems flourished; when people lost the ability 
to sanction cooperation plummeted.  
It is important to note that although reciprocity relationships greatly enhance 
inclusive fitness, they also hinge on a delicate balance of interests. Insofar as 
individuals profit from reciprocating with one another their interests coincide; 
however, because of genetic unrelatedness, this overlap is not complete (Alexander, 
1987). Therefore, selection will favour individuals who ―cheat‖ the system by 
contributing less than their peers (Trivers, 1971). Cheating spells disaster for a system 
of indirect reciprocity. Cheaters receive the same level of fitness benefits as do 
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reciprocators, but at a reduced cost, and therefore have higher inclusive fitness. This 
fitness advantage will cause genes that facilitate cheating to spread through a 
cooperative system until indirect reciprocity ultimately breaks down (Dawkins, 
1976).  
In order to prevent this eventuality, systems of indirect reciprocity require rules 
regarding relative contributions and benefits: a moral code. Since altruism increases 
fitness only under certain conditions, there would have been selection pressure for 
behavioural flexibility (Gangestad et al., 2006). Evolved psychological mechanisms 
that prescribe altruism should be sensitive to the conditions when altruism increased 
fitness and when it did not, leading to situationally appropriate behaviour (Krebs, 
2005). This assumption is in line with current theorizing on the nature of evolved 
mechanisms: they operate as ―if-then‖ decision-rules or strategies (Buss, 2004), that 
dispose individuals to respond differently in different social contexts (Barkow et al., 
1992).  
People and animals appear to accurately track the costs suffered and benefits enjoyed 
by each group member, and tend to adjust behavior accordingly, maintaining 
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Flack & de Waal, 2001). People are extremely adept at 
detecting cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). Those caught cheating arouse 
indignation; indignant individuals employ a variety of sanctions called moralistic 
aggression (Trivers, 1971). Accordingly, attitudes research indicates that emotion 
carries the motivational force in moral judgments—and not just any behavior, but 
strategic behavior that enforces moral norms.  For example, gratitude motivates 
repayment of social debts (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001), guilt 
motivates repair of  damaged relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 
1994), and anger motivates aggression at moral violators to sanction them for their 
violation (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Thus moral emotions may serve to 
motivate strategic behaviors that enable the system of reciprocity to endure, providing 
a net increase in inclusive fitness for all group members. 
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Essentially, moral judgments and behaviors seem geared towards upholding the social 
contract (Flack and de Waal, 2001). Individuals agree to contribute to the group (act 
morally) in return for the assurance that everyone else will. Violation of this contract 
(immoral behaviour) carries swift and stiff penalties (moralistic aggression). 
Morality, therefore, enables genetically selfish organisms to come together and 
harvest the fruits of non-zero-sum exchanges (Alexander, 1987), making group life 
possible (Flack and de Waal, 2001). When protected by morality, indirect reciprocity 
becomes an effective, attractive strategy. Genes that foster psychological mechanisms 
that foster it may out-compete those that give rise to relentless Hobbesian 
competition. Thus, it seems reasonable to posit that people have ancient, affect-laden 
responses to particular stimuli as those particular stimuli have repercussions for 
fitness outcomes, and therefore have played an important role in human evolutionary 
history. This may be why the tendency to develop and enforce moral codes is 
universal across cultures (Midgley, 1991).   
1.4.2 Cultural Variability in Moral Content 
It is worth noting that although the tendency to develop and enforce moral codes is 
universal, there also remains considerable variability in moral judgment. This is not a 
paradox—variation is part of evolution, and contexts can also shape moral norms by 
influencing which evolved strategies are most lucrative (for a discussion, see Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004). To account for this, Rozin and colleagues (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & 
Haidt, 1999) proposed the ‗CAD hypothesis‘ that in some cultures (e.g. India) 
morality was about more than just harm to victims (violations of autonomy)—
violations could also harm the moral domains of community and divinity (Haidt, 
Koller, & Dais, 1993). Whereas the morality of harm focuses on the right of each 
individual to be free of infringement/harm by his neighbour, the morality of 
community focuses on how well members of society fulfill the social role they are 
allotted. Dutifully playing one‘s role contributes to a smooth functioning society, 
which is of value to everyone. The morality of divinity focuses on the purity of body, 
mind, and soul, and avoiding sinful acts that debase the temple of the body. Each of 
these three domains of morality has been linked to specific other-directed moral 
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emotions: violations of autonomy generate anger, violations of community generate 
contempt, and violations of purity generate disgust. Haidt and Graham (2007) 
broadened this distinction into five moral foundations (Harm, fairness, loyalty, 
respect for authority, and purity), and Haidt (2012) has since added a sixth 
foundation, freedom.  
According to Rozin‘s classification system, moral dilemmas deal only with autonomy 
violations; they do not examine issues of purity or community. According to Haidt‘s 
classification system, moral dilemmas involve a clash between harm and fairness 
foundations—people wish to avoid causing harm (deontology), but also wish to be 
fair and rational, which might entail utilitarian sacrifice. They do not touch on moral 
issues pertaining to purity violations (such as the disgusting but harmless stories 
employed by Haidt et al, 1993) or violations of loyalty or authority. Thus, although 
moral dilemma research may be informative regarding some kinds of moral 
violations, it does not explain all of moral psychology; it is possible there are other 
systems involved in moral violations of purity or loyalty.  
Haidt (2008) argued that psychologists have traditionally examined a limited scope of 
the moral domain, in part because most scientists are White, Educated, liberal, and 
etc. Moral dilemma research may be vulnerable to that criticism in that it examines 
only harm and fairness violations; it is silent regarding the psychology of violations in 
other moral domains.  Although there is cultural variability in terms of the importance 
of moral foundations Haidt et al, 1993)—as well as liberal-conservative differences—
it is worth noting that nearly all participants in large international samples moralize 
the domains of harm and fairness (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Thus, moral 
dilemma research examines issues that tend to be perceived as morally relevant to a 
wide variety of people no matter what their cultural background.  
 In sum, there are reasons to believe that visceral, affect-laden reactions to particular, 
morally-relevant stimuli may ultimately stem from pressures in the deep evolutionary 
past, which shaped psychological mechanisms that motivated strategic behaviors that, 
heuristically, on average, may have improved fitness outcomes in a given context. In 
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addition, the human ability to engage in abstract, symbolic, deliberative, language-
based reasoning may have also been a product of more recent evolutionary processes, 
enabling humans to weigh many considerations against one another and make moral 
judgments about abstract concepts beyond the visceral, face-to-face morality of 
affect-laden moral judgments. If so, then both affective and cognitive moral 
processing may have an evolutionary origin; at least, the dual-process theory is 
compatible with such a view. However, the dual-process model is not the only theory 
of moral judgments consistent with evolutionary theory; another theory vies to 
explain moral dilemma judgments.  
1.4.3 Universal Grammar Theory 
Universal Moral Grammar theory (Mikhail, 2007) is modeled on Chomskyan 
linguistic theory (e.g., Chomsky, 1964), and aims to integrate computational, 
ontogenetic, behavioral, physiological and phylogenetic elements of morality. It 
entails two crucial arguments: first, that morality entails complex, domain-specific 
rules, concepts, and principles that allow people to make judgments about an infinite 
number of moral events, much as linguistic grammar allows people to construct 
infinitely new sentences. Second, there is a ‗poverty of the stimulus‘ argument—
young children couldn‘t possibly have enough time to learn the complexities of 
human morality through pure learning mechanisms given the early competence they 
demonstrate—and, therefore, Mikhail argued, at least some of the core attributes of 
morality are innate, where ―innate is used in a dispositional sense to refer to cognitive 
systems whose essential properties are largely pre-determined by the inherent 
structure of the mind, but whose ontogenetic development must be triggered and 
shaped by appropriate experience and can be impeded by unusually hostile learning 
environments‖ (2007, p. 144).   
Mikhail describes the current dual-process model of moral judgments as inadequate, 
as models must specify a) which ‗deontic rules‘ that pertain to a given moral 
judgment—deontology and utilitarianism as described here would both qualify as 
deontic rules according to Mikhail—as well as b) the structural descriptions of the 
computational operations involved (the semantic relations between means, ends, and 
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side-effects in each case), and c) the conversion rules that people use to construct 
those structures in the first place (i.e., how people determine causation, intent, 
consequences, etc.). Mikhail argues that moral dilemma judgments require lengthy, 
sophisticated, and abstract representations of complex phenomena (involving various 
actors, time points, intended effects, side effects, etc.), and are relatively fast, visceral, 
intuitive and at least partly inaccessible to conscious awareness. Therefore, he 
proposes that moral dilemma judgments must depend, in part, on innate, domain-
specific algorithms. Inconsistent judgments to various dilemma permutations (e.g., 
personal-impersonal) are resolved by an intuitive, lawyer-like ability to draw 
―intelligent distinctions between superficially similar cases, although their basis for 
doing so is often obscure‖ (p. 150). In other words, Mikhail disagrees with Greene‘s 
dual-process model, arguing that the difference between Greene‘s personal and 
impersonal dilemmas boils down to superficial differences.  Moreover, Mikhail takes 
exception to Greene and colleagues‘ contention that deontology and utilitarian 
judgments stem from the application of existing, domain general processes, rather 
than specific modules.  
Like Nichols and Mallon (2006), Mikhail is quite right to point out the dual-process 
model fails to carefully identify the exact features of the context that entail a moral 
violation, nor how those features are represented cognitively. Indeed, dilemma 
researchers have admitted that if participants represent moral dilemmas differently 
than researchers envision them, then participants are violating the closed world 
assumptions (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010) of the dilemma and their answer 
becomes uninterpretable in terms of the utilitarian/deontological distinction.  
That said, Mikhial is perhaps too quick to dismiss Greene and colleague‘s distinction 
between personal and impersonal dilemmas as relevant to the structure of morality. If 
both deontological and utilitarian judgments stem from essentially identical moral 
intuitions, Mikhail must account for the growing amount of evidence regarding 
distinct roles for visceral, affect-laden processes driving one kind of judgment and 
deliberative processes driving another; he does not. Moreover, Mikhail may be 
overstating the case when he dismisses the likelihood that humans and chimpanzees 
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share similar affective reactions to similar circumstances; these reactions may be 
heuristic in nature (e.g., triggered by the sight or thought of blood) rather than 
necessarily the product of long, complex chains of computational logic. Therefore, it 
is conservative to posit the same mechanism to underlie objectively similar displays 
of emotion (e.g., grimace, smile) in different species (Tomasello, 1991) 
Indeed, Chomsky has been criticized as excessively cognitive and computational—it 
may not be necessary to posit that young children are computing abstract linguistic 
elements algebraically. There is an alternative perspective that holds that a key human 
evolutionary adaptation was a single breakthrough—the ability to engage in joint 
attention with conspecifics, developing a theory of mind, which allows for symbolic 
representation, and therefore, language, which then becomes the gateway to 
developing logical thought. According to this perspective, the poverty of the stimulus 
argument is overstated. Tomasello (2006) summed up this perspective thus: 
―Usage-based theories hold that the essence of language is its symbolic 
dimension, with grammar being derivative. The ability to 
communicate with conspecifics symbolically (conventionally, 
intersubjectively) is a species specific biological adaptation. The 
grammatical dimension of language derives from historical processes 
of grammaticalization, which create various kinds of grammatical 
constructions (e.g., the English passive construction, noun phrase 
construction, or -ed past tense construction). As opposed to linguistic 
rules conceived of as algebraic procedures for combining words and 
morphemes but that do not themselves contribute to meaning, 
linguistic constructions are themselves meaningful linguistic symbols 
– since they are nothing other than the patterns in which meaningful 
linguistic symbols are used in communication (e.g., the passive 
construction is used to communicate about an entity to which 
something happens). In this approach, mature linguistic competence is 
conceived as a structured inventory of meaningful linguistic 
constructions - including both the more regular and the more idiomatic 
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structures in a given language (and all structures in between). 
According to the usage-based theory, there is no such thing as 
universal grammar and so the theoretical problem of how a child links 
it to a particular language does not exist. It is thus a single process 
theory of language acquisition, in the sense that children are thought to 
acquire the more regular and rule-based constructions of a language in 
the same way they acquire the more arbitrary and idiosyncratic 
constructions: they learn them.‖ (Tomasello, 2006, p. ).  
Similarly, it may be that people reasoning about morality are not always constructing 
the elaborate representational schemes that Mikhail describes. Sometimes they may 
be relying on more basic heuristics—the sight of blood may induce an affective 
reaction without the need for elaborate reasoning. That said, under those conditions 
when people are engaged in deliberative reasoning, it seems likely they are sensitive 
to the various factors outlined by Mikhail in detail that influence moral judgments.  
According to this perspective, when people encounter a morally-relevant stimulus, 
they may experience both a visceral reaction to harm that drives a particular 
judgment, as well as cognitive reasoning where they construct a careful account of 
intention, cause, effect, intended outcome, side-effect outcome, and carefully weigh 
these factors to moderate their judgment. In other words, the dual process model 
might be compatible with Mikhail‘s conception if the complex logical constructions 
he delineates are conceptualized as occurring at the deliberative level, whereas 
visceral, affective, or heuristic thinking carries independent variance in moral 
judgments. Mikhail admits that some of his claims are not conclusive, and that further 
research is needed to refine understanding of these complex issues.  The current work 
was not designed to test the difference between Greene‘s and Mikhail‘s theories, but 
insofar as the conclusions corroborate the dual-process model, they lend credence to 
Greene‘s dual-domain-general-process perspective. As such, they add to the growing 
debate between these perspectives.  
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1.5 Overview of the Field  
Since Greene and colleagues‘ (2001) landmark paper, a large and growing number of 
researchers began to investigate the correlates of moral judgments as well as 
situational factors that influence judgments. Now, over a decade later, moral dilemma 
research has grown into one of the predominant paradigms for investigating human 
moral psychology, with a variety of findings providing support for Greene‘s dual-
process model regarding the role of affect and cognition in moral dilemma judgments.  
Some moral dilemma research predated Greene and colleagues‘ (2001) landmark 
paper. Some early work by Petrinovich and colleagues (O'Neill & Petrinovich, 1998, 
Petrinovich & O‘Neill, 1996, Petrinovich, O‘Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993) varied the 
target of harm in trolley dilemmas, as well as the samples used to assess responses 
(e.g., American vs. Taiwanese samples). In these studies, people reported that killing 
one person to save five was most acceptable when that person was socially distant 
from the self (e.g., stranger, animal), especially if they were a member of a socially 
abhorrent group (e.g., The Nazi Party). Conversely, people were more reluctant to kill 
one person to save five when that person was someone similar to themselves (e.g., a 
kin or a friend). Nonetheless, people were also sensitive to the number of individuals 
saved, and responses reflected this pattern: when harmful action would save a great 
number of individuals, participants were most likely to select this option. These 
findings make sense, given that people tend to view similar others as more deserving 
of positive treatment than socially distant others (Olson, Hafer, Cheung, & Conway, 
2009).  
Petrinovich and colleagues argued that their findings were consistent with 
evolutionary theory: that people would skew their responses in order to maximize 
inclusive fitness. Their findings were also consistent with the dual-process model: 
targets closer to the self should elicit more affective responses than targets further 
from the self, thereby biasing judgments in favor of close targets and against socially 
distant ones. This pattern also fits with findings that people with damage to emotion 
centers in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whether due to lesions (Ciaramelli et 
al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) or frontotemporal dementia (Mendez et al., 2005), 
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make fewer deontological moral judgments, but do not score differently on low-
conflict or non-moral dilemmas.  People with damage to these brain regions evidence 
extreme cost-benefit reasoning in real life, as well as a callous disregard for other 
people‘s welfare reminiscent of psychopathy (Blair, 1997; Damasio, 1994).   
Utilitarian judgments are increased by manipulations that facilitate rational decision-
making, either by highlighting the consequences of action (Bartels, 2008, Study 1; 
Nichols & Mallon, 2006) or by placing decision options side-by-side (Bartels, 2008, 
Study 3).  Conversely, manipulations that impair cognitive operations impair reaction 
times for utilitarian decisions (Greene et al., 2008) and actually reduce utilitarian 
judgments (presumably due to decreased utilitarian inclinations, Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013).   
Participants with greater working memory capacity are more likely to make utilitarian 
decisions than participants with less capacity (Moore et al., 2008), as are participants 
higher in deliberative as opposed to intuitive thinking styles (Bartels, 2008; Nichols 
& Mallon, 2006).  Participants who endorse utilitarian judgments are more influenced 
by framing effects, compared to those who endorse deontology, perhaps because the 
former think harder about the decision (Tanner, Medin, & Iliev, 2008).   
Individuals higher in basal testosterone (Carney & Mason, 2010), who are less 
compassionate (Hermans, Putman, & van Honk, 2006), were also more likely to make 
utilitarian decisions, as were participants who watched comedy clips, presumably 
because mirth blunts the negative affect participants experience when considering 
harm (Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). Conversely, experiencing positive emotions that 
facilitate an other-oriented focus, such as moral elevation—a warm feeling of awe 
experienced upon witnessing another‘s good deeds (Haidt, 2003a)—increases 
deontological judgments (Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011). Anticipating 
physiological stress also increases deontological judgments, presumably because it 
makes participants more aware of their visceral reactions to harm, and more likely to 
sympathize with the victim of harm (Starcke, Ludwig, & Brand, 2012).  
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Conversely, manipulations that encourage participants to imagine the harmful 
consequences of action in vivid detail increase deontological responding. Visualizing 
harm vividly (Amit & Greene, 2012), responding to dilemmas written in an 
emotionally evocative manner (Bartels, 2008), or responding to dilemmas 
accompanied by visual depictions of the victim tend to increase deontological 
judgments—an effect driven by increased deontology, not reduced utilitarianism 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013). This is consistent with other work showing stronger 
negative affect for vividly imagined moral stimuli (Caruso & Gino, 2011). Moreover, 
when participants made moral judgment under time pressure, they were more likely 
to make deontological judgments (Suter & Hertwig, 2011), and participants who 
experienced stronger autonomic arousal also made more deontological judgments 
(Navarette, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2011). 
Not all studies have supported a cognitive-affective distinction between utilitarian and 
deontological judgments, Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, and Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2006) found activation in brain regions related to both emotion and cognition when 
participants made deontological or utilitarian judgments, and Manfrinati, Lotto, Sarlo, 
Palomba and Rumiati (2013) found no difference in reported emotional valence or 
arousal when participants made deontological vs. utilitarian decisions—but these 
findings should be interpreted with caution, as  the way they present these choices is 
an either-or scenario, rendering them vulnerable to the non-independence error (see 
below). Therefore, even if they found evidence of emotional responses when people 
selected one or the other option, it does not mean people felt that emotion because 
they selected that option—it could be that they selected that option despite feeling 
emotion. Moreover, Manfrinati and colleagues presented only a single study, which 
was underpowered (N = 36), so caution should be employed interpreting this null 
finding.  
Overall, a wealth of findings using a variety of techniques—ranging from fMRI to 
contextual manipulations to individual differences—provide support for Greene and 
colleagues‘ (2001) distinction between visceral, affect-laden reactions to harm, and 
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deliberative comparisons of outcomes. However, it turns out there is a conceptual 
problem in these studies that undermines how informative previous work can be.    
1.6 A Problem: The Non-independence Error 
A serious problem in traditional moral dilemma studies boils down to an issue of 
operationalization. When participants indicate that harm to save others is acceptable, 
researchers have surmised that this judgment arose due to strong utilitarian 
inclinations that overpowered weaker deontological inclinations. Conversely, when 
participants indicate that harm to save others is not acceptable, researchers have 
surmised that this judgment arose due strong deontological inclinations that 
overpowered weaker utilitarian inclinations. Thus, judgments have been treated as 
pure measures of process: if a person makes 70% deontological judgments and 30% 
utilitarian judgments, then researchers would give them a score of .3 on 
utilitarianism, even though they could also be coded as .7 on deontology (e.g., 
Koenigs et al., 2007). This coding implies an inverse relation between the two moral 
inclinations, in that stronger deontological inclinations imply weaker utilitarian 
inclinations, and vice versa. Note that when responding to dilemmas, selecting the 
deontological option (harm is unacceptable) also entails also rejecting the utilitarian 
option (harm is acceptable).  
Therein lies the rub: for any set of dilemma judgments, researchers cannot tell if the 
judgments arose from the strength of one inclination or the weakness of another. 
Should 30% utilitarian judgments be conceptualized as evidence of strong deontology 
or as evidence of weak utilitarianism? Note that the problem is not ameliorated by 
expanding the size of the scale, as some researchers have done (e.g., Bartels & 
Pizarro, 2011)—scales anchored by harm is acceptable at one end and harm is 
unacceptable at the other still treat them as inverse of one another. Granted, it might 
be possible that the constructs driving deontological and utilitarian judgments are the 
inverse of one another, in which case the current dilemmas‘ operationalization is 
sufficient. However, this possibly cannot be tested empirically unless one uses 
measures that assess the two inclinations independently.  
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Moreover, Greene and colleagues‘ (2001) dual-process process theory explicitly 
argues that deontological judgments are driven by visceral, affect-laden processes, 
whereas utilitarian judgments are driven by deliberative processes—this was the very 
insight that served to reconcile the rift between intuition-based and rationalist models 
of moral psychology. If, indeed, deontology and utilitarian judgments are opposites, 
then researchers cannot rule out whether they are actually the product of a single 
process (cf. Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Therefore, the way moral dilemma 
researchers have been measuring deontology and utilitarianism renders them 
vulnerable to criticisms from either pure intuitionist or pure rationalist camps—and 
then the field would be right back where it was in 2001, with no clear model 
integrating the roles of visceral, affect-laden processes with deliberative ones.  
Even if Greene‘s dual-process model is correct, then measuring deontology and 
utilitarianism as inverse would only be accurate in circumstances where a given 
person experiences one inclination much more strongly than the other. Instead, 
consider a person who experiences both strong deontological inclinations and strong 
utilitarian inclinations. Ultimately, despite caring deeply about the fate of five people, 
she also abhors harming one person so much that she selects harm is unacceptable. 
This person would be coded low on utilitarianism—a misclassification. Consider 
another person who experiences weak deontological and weak utilitarian 
inclinations—they don‘t particularly care about others‘ outcomes or about causing 
harm. Yet, she must choose a response, so she arbitrarily selects the response on the 
right: harm is acceptable. This person would be coded high on utilitarianism—
another misclassification.  
The second example above is problematic if people who don’t mind causing harm are 
being labeled high on utilitarianism. Indeed, there is a large and growing set of 
findings suggesting a link between utilitarian moral judgments and psychopathy 
(Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) and damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
leading to disordered behavior described as acquired sociopathy (Koenigs et al., 
2011). It is difficult to know what conclusion to draw from this work. One possibility 
is that psychopathy provides clarity and insight that increases a desire for utilitarian 
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outcomes. Another possibility is that psychopaths are not especially gifted in terms of 
deliberative reasoning; rather they lack the emotional responsiveness theorized to 
motivate aversion to harm.  
It seems likely that the second case is true: there is evidence that psychopaths and 
people with damage to the VMPFC make poor interpersonal decisions despite intact 
reasoning abilities (Cleckley, 1955; Moll et al, 2006; Saver & Damasio, 1991). 
Children with psychopathic tendencies are less likely to distinguish the moral from 
conventional domains (Blair, 1997), perhaps because they lack the visceral reactions 
others experience regarding moral vs. non-moral judgments (Arsenio & Ford, 1985). 
Indeed, there is debate over whether psychopaths are even capable of performing as 
moral agents, given their emotional impairments (e.g., Glannon, 2008; Ishtiyaque, 
2010).  
Nonetheless, current methods cannot rule out the possibility that psychopaths 
experience stronger utilitarian inclinations than other groups, because utilitarianism 
and deontology are confounded in the measures. Note that these possibilities matter 
not only with regard to the clarity of researchers‘ understanding regarding moral 
psychology; they also convey implications regarding the relation of society to known 
psychopaths. If the first conclusion is correct—psychopaths are adept at 
deliberation—then perhaps there is something the rest of society might learn from 
them with regards to moral decision-making. Conversely, if the second conclusion is 
correct—psychopaths are deficient in empathic concern—then perhaps society need 
not consider taking moral advice from psychopaths.  
Given the above limitations to traditional moral dilemma measurement, my colleague 
Bertram Gawronski and I resolved to develop a new measure of moral dilemma 
responses that was capable of overcoming the non-independence error by 
independently measuring the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations: 
process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991). If successful, such an approach would provide 
the advantages of (a) empirically testing whether deontology and utilitarian 
inclinations are inversely related, unrelated, or even positively related, (b) clarifying 
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the unique relations between each parameter to determine whether they correspond to 
constructs described by Greene and colleagues‘ dual-process model, and (c) 
clarifying relations between moral judgments and third variables (e.g., psychopathy). 
In so doing, we hoped to inform the ongoing debate regarding the nature of human 
moral psychology (for a discussion, see Paxton & Greene, 2011).  
1.7 Process Dissociation as a Potential Solution 
The problems inherent in the traditional approach can be overcome by employing 
Jacoby‘s (1991) PD procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological 
and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Jacoby originally developed the process 
dissociation procedure in order to tease apart the distinct contributions of 
recollection- versus familiarity-based memory performance. During the 1970s and 
1980s, there was a great deal of interest in dissociations between intentional recall 
and familiarity-based responses on memory tasks (for a review, see Hollender, 1986).  
Memory performance under impaired processing conditions (e.g., cognitive load or 
amnesia) was said to be driven wholly by familiarity, whereas unburdened 
performance was said to be driven wholly by conscious recollection.  In other words, 
researchers regarded tasks as process pure.  Jacoby (1991) criticized this conception 
as simplistic because it is unlikely that cognitive load completely eliminates 
conscious processing, or that automatic processes are silent when participants are 
asked to make controlled judgments.   
Jacoby presented participants with word lists, and then tested their ability to 
discriminate previously encountered words from new words.  Even under cognitive 
load, participants were more accurate when performance was facilitated by both 
familiarity and recollection (i.e., they were instructed to include words they 
consciously recognized as old) than when familiarity was pitted against recollection 
(i.e., they were instructed to exclude words they consciously recognized as old).  This 
indicates that it was a mistake to treat some tasks as pure measures of automatic 
processing and others as pure measures of controlled processing, because tasks were 
not process pure.   
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Jacoby found that participants were capable of correctly identifying more previously-
encountered words when familiarity and conscious recollection operated congruently 
than when one process was pitted against the other.  Based on this result, Jacoby 
surmised that the role of conscious recollection could be ascertained by subtracting 
the probability of correctly remembering a word when familiarity and recollection 
conflicted from the probability of correctly remembering a word when familiarity and 
recollection operated in concert.  Once controlled processing has been estimated, 
automatic processing can be derived by taking the probability of correctly 
remembering when processes conflict and dividing by the inverse of conscious 
processing.     
Although originally developed to examine memory processing, process dissociation is 
content agnostic and may be applied to any domain where traditional methods 
conflate the measurement of two psychological processes.  For example, PD has been 
employed to delineate the partially-overlapping contributions of weapon 
identification and racial bias when participants indicated whether objects held by 
White or Black people were guns or cell phones (Payne, 2001).  Payne demonstrated 
that the identification of target objects is an effortful, resource-dependent process, 
whereas racial bias is unaffected by momentarily available resources. PD has also 
helped distinguish the role of stereotype category information versus conscious 
recollection in memory for stereotypic traits (Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995), the 
role of heuristics versus rational calculation in economic decision-making (Ferreira, 
Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006), memory for primary and secondary 
emotions attributed to in-group and out-group members (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 
2002), and many other processes (for reviews, see Kelley & Jacoby, 2000; Payne & 
Bishara, 2009; Yonelinas, 2002).  Yet, as far as we are aware, process dissociation 
has never been applied to moral dilemma responses—a perfect candidate for PD, 
because responses are theorized to result from the operation of two separate 
processes, and these processes are conflated in traditional dilemma measures.   
Whereas memory researchers conflated memory judgments with processes, morality 
researchers conflate moral judgments with processes.  Moral dilemma response 
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options are typically dichotomous; participants must select either the deontological or 
utilitarian response (e.g., Greene et al., 2001).  Responses are then treated as process 
pure: Deontological decisions are presumed to stem from deontological processing; 
utilitarian decisions from utilitarian processing.  On the face of it, this assumption 
seems reasonable—after all, the dilemmas are designed so that deontology and 
utilitarianism lead to opposing responses.  Yet, this assumption requires inverse 
relations between deontology and utilitarianism, such that stronger deontological 
processing is redundant with weaker utilitarian processing.  This seems unlikely.  If 
theorists are correct that deontology and utilitarianism reflect affective and cognitive 
processing, respectively (see Greene, 2007), then these constructs ought to be 
orthogonal, or even positively related.  Therefore, both may independently contribute 
to each dilemma response.  Note that approaches that place deontology and 
utilitarianism on a continuum are still vulnerable to the same issue (e.g., Bartels & 
Pizarro, 2011).  
In order for participants to arrive at a deontological judgment, they must engage in (a) 
some degree of deontological processing, as well as (b) a lesser degree of utilitarian 
processing.  Likewise, utilitarian judgments require (a) some degree of utilitarian 
processing, coupled with (b) a lesser degree of deontological processing.  Thus, the 
judgments participants make tell us little about the processing behind those 
judgments: Deontological judgments may reflect either strong deontological 
processing or weak utilitarian processing, and utilitarian judgments may reflect either 
of the opposite cases.  Traditional methods of analysis cannot distinguish between 
these possibilities because deontology is not measured independently of 
utilitarianism.  Determining the strength of deontological and utilitarian processing 
behind moral dilemma judgments requires a fundamentally different kind of analysis.  
The key to process dissociation is employing both incongruent trials where the 
underlying processes lead to divergent responses, as well as congruent trials where 
they lead to the same response. This is a fundamental departure from Greene‘s 
personal-impersonal distinction. Both personal and impersonal dilemmas involve a 
situation where sacrificing one person will save five. This always pits deontological 
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ethical considerations against utilitarian ones; the difference is that one type is more 
emotionally evocative, essentially. Compare that to the incongruent-congruent 
distinction. Incongruent dilemmas pit deontological ethical considerations against 
utilitarian ones, in that causing harm will lead to greater positive outcomes. Consider 
the incongruent version of the torture dilemma:  
―You are a police officer, and have recently caught a criminal you have been 
hunting for some time. He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
explosive devices: some that have already gone off and some that have yet to 
detonate. He places explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go off at a 
time when people are drinking coffee on the patios. In this manner, he has 
injured many people and might injure many more. Now that the criminal is in 
custody, you want to know where the unexploded bombs are so you can 
defuse them. He refuses to talk, so you decide to use ―aggressive interrogation 
techniques‖ like holding his head under water and beating him. Is it 
appropriate for you to use ―aggressive interrogation techniques‖ in order to 
find and defuse the unexploded bombs?‖ (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
Incongruent dilemmas correspond to Greene and colleagues‘ (2001) personal 
dilemmas and Koenig et al.‘s (2007) high-conflict dilemmas. Thus, responses to these 
dilemmas may be summed and analyzed the traditional way: how many times did 
people say harm was acceptable or not acceptable when it leads to positive outcomes?  
In contrast, congruent dilemmas do not present a conflict between the underlying 
tendencies: deontological and utilitarian ethical positions agree. They are matched as 
closely as possible in content and wording to incongruent dilemmas, except that the 
consequences of harm are far less beneficial. As a result, it is possible to reject harm 
on either utilitarian or deontological grounds (i.e., the processes that drive 
deontological and utilitarian judgments will both motivate a judgment that harm is 
unacceptable). For example, consider the congruent version of the torture dilemma:  
 ―You are a police officer, and have recently caught a criminal you have been 
hunting for some time. He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
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explosive devices: some that have already gone off and some that have yet to 
detonate. He places explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go off at a 
time when no one is around. His explosives are inside paint cans so that they 
spray nearby objects with paint. In this manner, he has sprayed many cafes 
with paint and might spray many more. Now that the criminal is in custody, 
you want to know where the unexploded bombs are so you can defuse them. 
He refuses to talk, so you decide to use ―aggressive interrogation techniques‖ 
like holding his head under water and beating him. Is it appropriate for you to 
use ―aggressive interrogation techniques‖ in order to find and defuse the 
unexploded bombs?‖ (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
Participants‘ judgments in congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas can be 
illustrated by means of a processing tree (see Figure 1). Each path from left to right 
depicts judgment outcomes on the two kinds of dilemmas as a function of distinct 
processes. The three paths in the figure capture the three cases that (1) utilitarianism 
ultimately drives the response (top path), (2) deontology ultimately drives the 
response (middle path), and (3) neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives the 
response (bottom path). U depicts the case that utilitarianism drives the response, and 
D depicts the case that deontology drives the response. Conversely, 1 – U depicts the 
case that utilitarianism does not drive the response, and 1 – D depicts the case that 
deontology does not drive the response. Using the table on the right side of the figure, 
it is then possible to use these cases to identify their judgment outcomes for congruent 
and incongruent dilemmas. In congruent dilemmas, for example, participants will 
judge harm as unacceptable when utilitarianism drives the response (U). 
Alternatively, if utilitarianism does not drive the response (1 – U), harm will still be 
judged as unacceptable when deontology drives the response (D). Harm will be 
judged as acceptable in congruent dilemmas only when neither utilitarianism (1 – U) 
nor deontology (1 – D) drives the response. Similarly, in incongruent dilemmas, 
participants will judge harm as unacceptable when utilitarianism does not drive the 
response (1 – U) and, at the same time, deontology does drive the response (D). 
However, harm will be judged as acceptable either when utilitarianism drives the 
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response (U), or alternatively when neither utilitarianism (1 – U) nor deontology (1 – 
D) drives the response.  
By means of the processing paths depicted in Figure 1, it is now possible to create 
mathematical equations that delineate the probability of a particular overt judgment in 
congruent and incongruent dilemmas as a function of the two underlying inclinations. 
For example, the probability of overtly judging harm as unacceptable in a congruent 
dilemma is represented by the cases where (1) utilitarianism drives the response, and 
(2) deontology drives the response when utilitarianism fails to drive the response. In 
algebraic terms, this probability may be represented as:  
(1) p(unacceptable | congruent) = U + [(1 – U) × D]  
Conversely, the probability of judging harm as acceptable in a congruent dilemma is 
represented by the case that neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives the response, 
which can be represented algebraically as: 
(2) p(acceptable | congruent) = (1 – U) × (1 – D) 
The same logic can be applied to incongruent dilemmas. For example, the probability 
of judging harm as unacceptable in an incongruent dilemma is represented by the case 
that deontology drives the response when utilitarianism does not drive the response. 
Algebraically, this likelihood is represented by the equation: 
(3) p(unacceptable | incongruent) = (1 – U) × D 
 Conversely, the probability of judging harm as acceptable in an incongruent dilemma 
is represented by the cases that (1) utilitarianism drives the response, and (2) neither 
deontology nor utilitarianism drives the response. In algebraic terms, this probability 
is represented as: 
(4) p(acceptable | incongruent) = U + [(1 – U) × (1 – D)] 
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Figure 1: Processing tree illustrating the underlying components leading to judgments 
that harmful action is either acceptable or unacceptable in congruent and incongruent 
moral dilemmas. The paths from left to right depict the three cases that (1) 
utilitarianism ultimately drives the response, (2) deontology ultimately drives the 
response, and (3) neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives the response.  
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Using the empirically observed probabilities of participants‘ acceptable and 
unacceptable responses on congruent and incongruent dilemmas, these equations can 
be used to calculate numerical estimates for the two kinds of moral inclinations by 
solving algebraically for the two parameters representing deontology (D) and 
utilitarianism (U). Specifically, by integrating Equation 3 into Equation 1, the latter 
can be solved for U, leading to the following formula: 
(5) U = p(unacceptable | congruent) - p(unacceptable | incongruent) 
Moreover, by including the calculated value for U in Equation 3, this equation can be 
solved for D, leading to the following formula:  
(6) D = p(unacceptable | incongruent) / (1 – U) 
These two formulas provide researchers with a means to quantify the strength of 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations within participants. For example, if a 
participant shows an unacceptable response on 7 out of 10 congruent dilemmas (i.e., 
probability of .70) and on 2 out of 10 incongruent dilemmas (i.e., probability of .20), 
the above equations would estimate this participant‘s utilitarian inclination with a 
value of .50 and his or her deontological inclination with a value of .40 (for a 
discussion of the metric of each score, as well as other technical details of PD, see 
Appendix 2B). Such parameter estimates can be calculated for each participant in a 
given sample, allowing researchers to use them as measurement scores in 
experimental or individual difference designs. Critically, these scores need not be 
negatively correlated (i.e., stronger inclinations of one kind are associated with 
weaker inclinations of the other kind), as implied by the traditional bipolar treatment 
of moral dilemma responses. Instead, they may vary independently, so that the two 
parameters may demonstrate unique relations with other variables and distinct effects 
of experimental manipulations.   
It is important to note that the processing paths depicted in Figure 1 represent 
conditional probabilities that (1) utilitarianism ultimately drives the response, (2) 
deontology ultimately drives the response, and (3) neither utilitarianism nor 
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deontology drives the response. The definition of the processing paths in terms of 
which inclination ultimately drives the response is the reason why there is no fourth 
path in which both utilitarianism and deontology drive the response. After all, only 
one of the two moral inclinations can ultimately drive the response. The strength of 
underlying moral inclinations is estimated by comparing responses on congruent and 
incongruent dilemmas over multiple trials, allowing researchers to calculate two 
independent inclination scores on the basis of observed conditional probabilities using 
the equations outlined in the main text of this article.  
Note that this model is agnostic regarding which process comes first temporally. 
Although, it first delineates the U parameter, and then uses that parameter to calculate 
the D parameter, this does not imply that utilitarian processing occurs first, and 
deontological processing coming in later. Indeed, the dual process model suggests 
that visceral, affective processes associated with deontology occur rapidly and 
automatically upon noticing a potential moral violation, whereas deliberative 
processes associated with utilitarianism require additional processing time. The model 
in Figure 1 is consistent with this perspective.  
Yet, the processing paths do imply that utilitarianism will likely drive responses when 
sufficiently strong; deontology may only drive responses when utilitarianism is 
relatively weak. Indeed, any application of PD requires a decision as to whether one 
or the other process dominates responses. In the processing tree depicted in Figure 2, 
utilitarianism is assumed to dominate, such that deontology may drive the response 
only if utilitarianism fails to drive the response (U-dominant model). However, it is 
also possible to construct a PD model in which deontology dominates responses, such 
that utilitarianism may drive the response only if deontology fails to drive the 
response (D-dominant model). With regard to the implied outcomes in the table on 
the right side of the figure, the two PD variants have the same implications for the 
paths in which either utilitarianism or deontology ultimately drive the response. 
However, the two variants differ with regard to predicted outcomes when neither 
utilitarianism nor deontology drives the response. Specifically, the structure of PD 
implies that, when neither process drives the response, the outcomes are opposite to 
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those when the subordinate process drives the response. Thus, whereas the U-
dominant model implies acceptance of harm in both congruent and incongruent 
dilemmas (see Jacoby, 1991), the D-dominant model implies acceptance of harm in 
congruent dilemmas but rejection of harm in incongruent dilemmas (see Lindsay & 
Jacoby, 1994). Although these differences lead to somewhat different equations for 
the two parameters (see Payne & Bishara, 2009), the two models produced identical 
results in the studies reported in this these (with the exception that the two PD 
parameters of the D-dominant model evince moderate positive correlations across all 
three studies).  
We believe that the U-dominant model reported in the current paper is preferable for 
two reasons. First, PD models that are structurally equivalent to the U-dominant 
model have been validated and applied to a wide range of different tasks (e.g., 
recognition memory, sequential priming, heuristic judgment; for a review, see Payne 
& Bishara, 2009), whereas PD models that are structurally equivalent to the D-
dominant model have been used in only one publication on Stroop performance 
(Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Second, and more importantly, the D-dominant model 
makes the theoretically implausible assumption that, when neither utilitarianism nor 
deontology drives responses, participants accept harm in congruent dilemmas, but 
reject harm in incongruent dilemmas. In other words, the absence of any moral 
concern would lead to acceptance of major harm but rejection of minor harm. 
Conversely, the U-dominant model makes the more plausible assumption that 
participants accept harm in both congruent and incongruent dilemmas when neither 
moral inclination drives the response. Unconditional acceptance of harm plausibly 
reflects the absence of moral concern, in that people simply do not care about the 
harm their actions are causing. Thus, we endorse the U-dominant model for the 
application of PD to moral dilemmas, especially considering that the U-dominant and 
D-dominant PD models produced almost identical results in the current work.  
1.8 The Current Project 
Although process dissociation allows for the calculation of independent parameters, it 
does not guarantee that these parameters, in and of themselves, map onto theorized 
              PROCESS DISSOCIATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT 42 
  
constructs. Rather, they must be validated as one would validate any new measure: by 
examining the unique relations each measured variable shares with other established 
constructs, as well as examining the impact of theoretically-meaning contextual 
manipulations. By empirically examining these factors it becomes possible to draw 
conclusions as to whether the parameters appear to tap constructs expected given the 
dual-process model (Greene et al., 2001), and, if so, whether they corroborate this 
model or cast doubt on whether it accurately represents human moral psychology. 
Once the construct validity of each parameter is established, it becomes possible to 
employ them to examine theoretical issues in the field at a higher degree of resolution 
than was possible before.  
This leads us to the current project: in five studies we (myself and two sets of co-
authors) developed, validated, and applied a process dissociation measure of the 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations underpinning judgments on moral dilemmas. 
In Conway and Gawronski (2013) Study 1, we examined the relations between the 
PD parameters and theoretically relevant individual-difference variables (e.g., the 
utilitarian parameter uniquely predicted cognitive load, whereas the deontology 
parameter uniquely predicted empathic concern and perspective-taking). In Study 2, 
we determined whether a cognitive load manipulation would selectively reduce 
utilitarian inclinations, whereas in Study 3, we examined whether a manipulation that 
increased the vividness of harm selectively increases the deontology parameter. If 
successful, these findings would suggest that the deontology parameter is successfully 
tapping affective reactions to harm, whereas the utilitarian parameter is tapping 
cognitive evaluations of outcomes (consistent with the dual-process model, Green et 
al., 2001). Next, we aimed to apply this technique to clarify the relations between 
utilitarianism and deontology with both pro- and anti-social tendencies. In Study 1 of 
Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro (under review), participants scoring higher in 
Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and meaninglessness also made more overt 
utilitarian judgments (replicating past findings), but process dissociation revealed that 
this relation was due to decreased deontology rather than increased utilitarianism 
among people high in antisocial personality traits. Study 2 demonstrated that the 
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 Typically, researchers describe the dual-process model as suggesting that affective 
reactions to harm drive deontological judgments, whereas cognitive evaluations of 
outcomes drive utilitarian judgments (e.g., Greene, 2007a)—but this is not to say that 
affect plays no role in utilitarian judgment or that cognition plays no role in 
deontological judgments. Greene and colleagues (2004) pointed out that on one level, 
all psychological experiences qualify as ―cognition‖ in that all psychology involves 
information processing. Yet, they maintained that a distinction between cognition and 
emotion is possible despite being poorly understood:  
―Throughout this article, we have relied on the familiar distinction between 
‗emotion‘ or ‗affect‘ on the one hand and ‗cognition‘ on the other. This 
distinction has proven useful, and yet it may be somewhat artificial. The term 
‗cognition‘ is often defined in terms of ‗information processing,‘ but all of the 
processes considered here, including those that we have labeled ‗emotional,‘ 
involve information processing, thus calling into question the usefulness of 
this definition of ‗cognition.‘ Alternatively, one might render the 
emotion/cognition distinction in terms of a contrast between, on the one hand, 
representations that have direct motivational force and, on the other hand, 
representations that have no direct motivational force of their own, but that 
can be contingently connected to affective/emotional states that do have such 
force, thus producing behavior that is both flexible and goal directed. 
According to this view, the emotion/cognition distinction is real, but it is a 
matter of degree and, at the present time, not very well understood. It is within 
a framework of this sort that we retain and utilize the emotion/cognition 
distinction while recognizing that this distinction is far from clear cut‖ (2004, 
p. 397-398).  
Therefore, Greene and colleagues maintain a distinction between ‗emotion‘ and 
‗cognition‘ by arguing the former construct entails direct motivational force, whereas 
the latter entails motivation via more distal related processes. Indeed, Greene and 
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colleagues (2004) argue that the motivational force in utilitarian judgments stems 
from affect elicited by the products of cognition:  
 ―Like David Hume (Hume, 1978), we suspect that all action, whether driven 
by ‗cognitive‘ judgment or not, must have some affective basis. Even a cold, 
calculating utilitarian must be independently motivated, first, to engage in the 
reasoning that utilitarian judgment requires and, second, to respond in 
accordance with such judgment‖ (2004, p. 397).  
Moreover, although Greene and colleagues do not directly examine the issue, they 
appear to tacitly accept that cognition plays a role in deontological judgments as well. 
Nichols and Mallon (2006) developed this argument much further: they argued that 
deontological intuitions require not only negative emotional responses, but also the 
appraisal that a moral rule has been violated. Otherwise, any time people experienced 
negative affect, they would judge that a moral rule has been violated (for example, 
during ritual circumcision). Hence, Nichols and Mallon described deontological 
moral rules as affect-backed rules, to distinguish them from mere negative affect 
without perception of a rule violation, and from non-affect-backed rules.  Nichols and 
Mallon found that when a moral rule is violated and people experience strong 
negative affect, they display all-in impermissibility, judging harm to be morally 
wrong regardless of the consequences: a deontological response.  When the same rule 
is violated but people do not experience strong affect, they display weak 
impermissibility, in that they judge harm to be morally wrong, but acceptable, all 
things considered—a consequentialist response.  Thus, their model involves three 
components: a) the recognition that a violation has occurred, b) an affective reaction, 
and c) a cognitive response. Nichols and Mallon‘s conceptualization of affect-backed 
moral rules offers a conceptual advance over traditional moral dilemma research. Yet, 
most moral dilemma research (including the current work) tacitly assumes that 
participants perceive a moral violation has occurred and focuses on subsequent 
processing—a reasonable, if untested, assumption. Hence, the current work is fully 
compatible with Nichols and Mallon‘s and Greene and colleagues (2004) insights 
regarding the tangled roles of cognition and affect in moral judgments. Nonetheless, 
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following Greene and colleagues (2004), the current work draws a distinction 
between affective and cognitive processing until such time as a more fleshed-out 
framework for the interplay between these forces in moral judgment becomes 
widespread. In the meantime, it may be wise for moral dilemma researchers to more 
regularly employ Greene‘s phrase matter of degree—for both deontological and 
utilitarian judgments seem to entail some degree of both cognition and emotion; they 
appear to differ in the strength of these processes rather than their absolute presence 
or absence. 
2
 Readers familiar with philosophy will note a fundamental discrepancy between the 
dual-process model of moral judgments and the philosophical positions associated 
with each process. Kant (1785/1959) argued that the only route to deontological 
moral judgments was through rational appreciation of duty, whereas Greene and 
colleagues (2001) argued that deontological decisions arise from affective reactions to 
harm. Similarly, utilitarian ethical considerations have a historical association with 
affect, given that utility may be conceptualized as overall happiness or wellbeing 
(Hume, 1969; Mill, 1861/1998). Greene and colleagues were well aware of this 
discrepancy—so much so that Greene titled his dissertation publication The Secret 
Joke of Kant’s Soul (2007b). In this paper, Greene clarified:  
―Because I am interested in exploring the possibility that deontology and 
consequentialism are psychological natural kinds, I will put aside their 
conventional philosophical definitions and focus instead on their relevant 
functional roles. As noted earlier, consequentialists and deontologists have 
some characteristic practical disagreements. For example, consequentialists 
typically say that killing one person in order to save several others may be the 
right thing to do, depending on the situation. Deontologists, in contrast, 
typically say that it‘s wrong to kill one person for the benefit of others, that 
the ‗ends don‘t justify the means.‘ Because consequentialists and 
deontologists have these sorts of practical disagreements, we can use these 
disagreements to define consequentialist and deontological judgments 
functionally. For the purposes of this discussion, we‘ll say that 
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consequentialist judgments are judgments in favor of characteristically 
consequentialist conclusions (e.g., ―Better to save more lives‖) and that 
deontological judgments are judgments in favor of characteristically 
deontological conclusions (e.g., ―It‘s wrong despite the benefits‖)… 
[Therefore,] when I refer to something as a ‗deontological judgment‘ I am 
saying that it is a characteristically deontological judgment and am not 
insisting that the judgment in question necessarily meets the criteria that 
philosophers would impose for counting that judgment as deontological‖ 
(2007b, p. 38-39).  
However, given the etymological history of the words deontology and utilitarianism, 
it is actually rather presumptuous of psychologists and other scientists to use these 
terms interchangeably with moral dilemma judgments—these terms refer to more 
than mere judgments in philosophy; they also entail assumptions regarding the 
process by which people arrive at a given judgment. The problem with conflating 
philosophical terminology with dilemma judgments is that contentious conclusions 
may be drawn. Greene and colleagues (2004) argued, ―Should this [dual-process] 
account prove correct, however, it will have the ironic implication that the Kantian, 
‗rationalist‘ approach to moral philosophy is, psychologically speaking, grounded not 
in principles of pure practical reason, but in a set of responses that are subsequently 
rationalized‖ (2004, p. 398). Greene went on to argue that as a consequence, 
deontology ought to be discounted as a genuine moral position; rather, people should 
be encouraged to make utilitarian judgments (Greene, 2003)—a potion that garnered 
stiff opposition (e.g., Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2008).  
In the current work there are no such assumptions regarding the legitimacy of one or 
another ethical position; the focus is purely descriptive, aimed at understanding the 
factors that influence moral dilemma judgments. To this end, it might be 
advantageous to adopt more neutral labels, such as judgments that harm is not 
acceptable in place of deontological judgments, and judgments that harm is 
acceptable in place of utilitarian judgments. Nonetheless, given that the practice of 
using these terms interchangeably is so common in the field as to be essentially 
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ubiquitous, for the time being I have co-opted this language despite the complex 
theoretical baggage it entails. I look forward to future discussion aimed at revising the 
terminology employed, but recognize that the current work is not an appropriate 
forum for this discussion.  
3
 Greene and colleagues (2009) argued that the doctrine of double effect fails to 
adequately explain moral judgments, as intention to harm a person as a means to 
saving the others, rather than as a foreseen but unintended consequence of action, 
impacted judgments of acceptability only when harm was dealt via personal force 
rather than through a mechanical intermediary.  
4
 Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) also presented reaction time data suggesting 
that people took longer on impersonal than personal dilemmas, but later retracted this 
claim (Greene and colleagues, 2008) after Liane Young pointed out inconsistencies in 
their dilemma classification system (see also McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, & 
Mackenzie, 2009). When they reanalyzed their data, the fMRI and behavioral data 
stood up, but the reaction time data did not. Therefore, we will not consider these data 
further.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral 
Decision-Making: A Process Dissociation Approach 
Paul Conway and Bertram Gawronski, The University of Western Ontario  
Copyright © 2013 by the American Psychological Association, Reproduced with 
Permission. The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is 
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
104, 216–235. doi:10.1037/a0031021. No further reproduction or distribution is 
permitted without written permission from the American Psychological Association.  
Article available at http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp  
2.1 Abstract 
Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas 
are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the 
morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming 
others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies 
that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others 
is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the 
proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous 
work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind 
imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby‗s 
(1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the 
usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both 
inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely 
related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian 
inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that 
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cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological 
inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance 
empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being 
unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of 
deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many 
theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Are Psychopaths Really More Utilitarian? Process 
Dissociation Clarifies the Relations Between 
Utilitarianism, Deontology, Anti-Social Personality 
Traits, and Prosociality 
Paul Conway, Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario, Canada 
Daniel M. Bartels, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, United States 
David A. Pizarro, Department of Psychology, Cornell University, United States  
3.1 Abstract 
Recent research using traditional sacrificial moral dilemmas to measure of moral 
judgment has demonstrated a puzzling finding—that people who score higher in 
antisocial personality traits (such as psychopathy) also make more utilitarian decisions. 
To shed light on this finding, we conducted two studies using a process dissociation 
technique which allowed us to independently estimate whether utilitarian moral 
judgments are driven by increased utilitarian concerns or as a result of reduced 
deontological inclinations. Study 1 demonstrated that the relation between utilitarian 
decisions and antisocial traits was not driven by increased utilitarian inclinations, but 
rather decreased deontological ones. Study 2 demonstrated that utilitarian and 
deontological inclinations each predicted different kinds of prosocial motivation. 
Together, these results suggest that utilitarian judgments among participants with 
antisocial personality traits arise not as a result of a commitment to maximizing the 
overall outcome, but rather due to a blunted aversion to causing harm.  
3.2 Introduction 
Consequentialist ethical positions such as utilitarianism (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998) impose 
the moral requirement that people act in ways that maximize overall outcomes. Thus, 
utilitarianism mandates killing one person to save several others. Likewise, it mandates 
forgoing one‘s disposable income to help the less fortunate. Conversely, rule-based 
ethical positions such as deontology (e.g., Kant, 1785/1959) impose the moral 
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requirement that people abide by a moral rule (such as do no harm) regardless of whether 
doing so leads to the best overall consequences. According to deontology, killing an 
innocent person is forbidden—even to save multiple lives—but there is no mandate to 
forgo one‘s disposable income to benefit others (Kagan, 1998).  
Recently, moral psychologists have adduced evidence suggesting that deontological and 
utilitarian ethical judgments arise from differing psychological processes: Deontological 
judgments are associated with fast, visceral, affective processing, whereas utilitarian 
judgments are associated with slow, effortful, and resource-dependent processing (see, 
e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; 
Greene et al., 2001, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005; cf. 
Baron, 2011; Kahane et al., 2012). Researchers have collected this evidence through the 
use of high-conflict moral dilemmas, designed to pit one ethical position against the other 
(e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007). High-conflict dilemmas entail dealing harm in order to 
achieve a greater positive outcome; participants indicate whether or not such harm is 
acceptable. Researchers traditionally treat these judgments as a proxy for underlying 
psychological processes: utilitarian responses presumably reflect cognitive deliberation, 
whereas deontological responses presumably reflect affective processing. As we will 
discuss below, this may be an error.  
3.2.1 A Problem for the Field 
The premise that utilitarian judgments arise from cognitive evaluations of outcomes fails 
to explain the elevated levels of utilitarian responding observed in people who score high 
on measures of psychopathic personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) or patients with 
damage to the ventromedial cortex (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Mendez et al., 2005), 
considering that such people demonstrate affective deficits, but no cognitive advantages 
(Koenigs et al., 2007). Therefore, it is possible that these participants‘ utilitarian 
judgments reflect weak aversion to harm rather than strong motivation to maximize 
outcomes. Traditional methods cannot distinguish between these possibilities.  
Traditional methods also fail to capture a central feature of utilitarianism—its emphasis 
on maximizing good consequences. Philosophical conceptualizations of utilitarianism 
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entail decision-making focused on maximizing outcomes regardless of whether doing so 
requires dealing harm (Kagan, 1998; Mill, 1861/1998). Utilitarianism therefore mandates 
prosocial behavior, such as donating one‘s disposable income to charity. It is currently 
unclear whether the psychological processes that motivate utilitarian judgments on moral 
dilemmas also motivate the prosociality mandated by utilitarian ethics. We employed 
process dissociation to examine this question as well.  
3.2.2 Process Dissociation as a Solution  
It remains unclear why individuals higher in psychopathic traits prefer overt utilitarian 
judgments, because more than one process contributes to overt responses to moral 
dilemmas, an issue called the non-independence error (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
Moral dilemmas, by design, require a tradeoff between utilitarian and deontological 
options.  Every time a person makes a tradeoff of one (moral or amoral) good for another, 
their responses are multiply-determined. Thus, overt judgments do not cleanly map onto 
one construct; each judgment results from the strength of both utilitarian and 
deontological inclinations, as well as other processes. Accordingly, overt ‗utilitarian‘ 
judgments need not reflect strong utilitarian inclinations; they may instead reflect reduced 
deontological inclinations, or increased strength of non-moral processes.  
In order to overcome the non-independence error, Conway and Gawronski (2013) 
adapted a technique—process dissociation (PD)—to estimate the independent 
contributions of two processes when both contribute to overt performance. Although 
originally developed to disentangle conflated memory processes (Jacoby, 1991), process 
dissociation is content-agnostic (for a review, see Payne & Bishara, 2009).  Process 
dissociation entails comparing performance on incongruent tasks, where processes are 
theorized to conflict, with performance on congruent tasks, where processes are theorized 
to lead to the same response. In the case of moral dilemmas, incongruent dilemmas 
correspond to traditional, high-conflict moral dilemmas where causing some degree of 
harm will lead to greater positive outcomes (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007). Congruent 
―dilemmas‖ are those in which harm no longer leads to greater positive outcomes—
scenarios in which deontology and utilitarianism ought to lead to the same response 
(avoid harm).  
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Consider, for example, the torture dilemma, where participants must decide whether it is 
acceptable to torture a man in order to prevent an explosion. In the incongruent version, 
the explosion will kill people, so utilitarianism entails accepting torture in order to save 
lives (maximize outcomes), whereas deontology entails rejecting torture (as harm is 
always wrong according to deontology). Conversely, in the congruent version of the 
torture dilemma, the explosion is a messy but harmless paint bomb; now utilitarianism 
and deontology both entail rejecting torture, as torture no longer maximizes overall 
welfare.  
To the degree that participants experience deontological inclinations, they should reject 
harm on both incongruent and congruent dilemmas; to the degree that participants 
experience utilitarian inclinations, they should reject harm on congruent but not 
incongruent dilemmas. Based on each participants‘ pattern of responses across both types 
of dilemmas, process dissociation algebraically derives two parameters that correspond to 
the degree to which each participant rejected harm on both congruent and incongruent 
dilemmas (the deontology parameter), and the degree to which participants rejected harm 
on congruent but not incongruent dilemmas (the utilitarian parameter). Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) found that the deontology parameter uniquely predicted empathic 
concern and was enhanced when harm was made salient, whereas the utilitarian 
parameter uniquely predicted need for cognition and was impaired by a cognitive load 
manipulation. The parameters themselves were uncorrelated.  
3.2.3 The Current Work 
In Study 1, we employed Conway and Gawronski‘s process dissociation technique in 
order to clarify the relations between deontology, utilitarianism, and antisocial 
personality traits. This analysis allowed us to determine whether the impact of antisocial 
personality traits on overt utilitarian judgments is driven by increased utilitarian 
inclinations or reduced deontological inclinations (or both) among people with antisocial 
personality traits. In Study 2, we examined the association between the utilitarian and 
deontology process dissociation parameters and prosocial motivation. If measurements of 
utilitarianism as captured by dilemma studies correspond to philosophical conceptions of 
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utilitarianism (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998), then the utilitarian parameter ought to positively 
relate to prosociality.   
3.3 Study 1 
Study 1 examined whether the relation between utilitarian responding and morally 
questionable personality traits identified by Bartels and Pizarro (2011) is driven by an 
enhanced endorsement of utilitarianism or a reduced sensitivity to deontological 
considerations, or both.  
3.3.1 Method 
Participants. Eighty-nine participants (49 male, 40 female) were recruited for payment 
via www.mturk.com (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011): 67 Caucasian, 3 Black, 
2 Aboriginal, 10 Asian, and 7 other (Mage=34.07, SD=13.03).  
Procedure and materials. Participants read a series of moral dilemmas and completed a 
set of individual-difference scales (described below).  
Moral dilemmas. We employed the 10 moral dilemmas used by Conway and Gawronski 
(2013), each with one congruent and one incongruent version, in the same fixed random 
order. Each dilemma described harmful action that would achieve a particular outcome. 
Participants indicated whether the harmful action was appropriate or inappropriate (see 
Greene et al., 2001). Incongruent versions correspond to traditional, high-conflict moral 
dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), in that action involves causing some degree of harm 
(e.g., kill one person) to achieve a more positive outcome (e.g., save multiple people). 
Conversely, congruent versions involve causing some degree of harm (e.g., kill one 
person) to achieve a less positive outcome (e.g., save no one).  
Individual difference scales. Following the dilemma task, participants responded to the 
72 individual-difference items employed by Bartels and Pizarro (2011) on 7-point scales 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The order of items was randomized for 
each participant. The items comprised a 30-item psychopathy scale (SRP-III; Paulhus, 
Neumann, & Hare, in press), e.g., I never feel guilty over hurting others (α=.92), a 20-
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item Machiavellianism scale (Mach-IV; Christie & Geis, 1970), e.g., Never tell anyone 
the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so (α=.83), an 18-item No 
Meaning scale (Kunzendorf, Moran, & Gray, 1995), e.g., All strivings in life are futile 
and absurd (α=.95) and a 10-item Social Desirability scale (MC-1; Strahan & Gerbasi, 
1972), e.g., I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake (α=.67). Finally, 
participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity.  
3.3.2 Results and Discussion  
We calculated overt ‗utilitarian‘ dilemma judgments by summing the number of times 
participants indicated that harmful action was acceptable across the ten incongruent 
(high-conflict) moral dilemmas (following Greene et al., 2001). Note that overt 
judgments may be described as either ‗utilitarian‘ or ‗deontological‘ depending on 
whether one tallies acceptance or rejection of harm. Examining overt judgments, we 
replicated the findings reported by Bartels and Pizarro (2011): people who made more 
‗utilitarian‘ judgments also scored higher on psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and 
meaninglessness (see Table 3). As discussed above, these findings remain ambiguous 
because overt judgments reflect both utilitarianism and deontology. Therefore, these 
findings might indicate positive relations between utilitarianism and antisocial 
personality traits, or they might indicate negative relations between deontology and 
antisocial personality traits. Process dissociation can disambiguate these possibilities. 
We calculated utilitarian and deontology process dissociation parameters according to the 
metric provided by Conway and Gawronski (2013), and examined the correlations 
between the utilitarian and deontological PD parameters and each personality variable. 
Consistent with Conway and Gawronski, overt utilitarian judgments correlated positively 
with the utilitarian PD parameter and negatively with the deontological PD parameter—
these correlations were moderate to strong (Cohen, 1988)—suggesting that the PD 
parameters and overt dilemma judgments are tapping related, but not redundant, 
constructs (see Table 3). Moreover, the PD parameters were uncorrelated with one 
another, replicating Conway and Gawronski, and further corroborating the independence 
of these processes (Greene, 2007).  
  











PD Utilitarianism   .44***   
PD Deontology -.78***  .15  
Machiavellianism  .41***  .02 -.49*** 
Psychopathy  .41*** -.10 -.54*** 
No Meaning   .30** -.16 -.43*** 
Social Desirability -.21* -.09  .21* 
Gender (1 = male, 2 = female) -.28** -.01  .30** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 3: Correlations between Overt ‗Utilitarian‘ Judgments, Process Dissociation 
Utilitarianism Scores, Process Dissociation Deontology Scores, and Personality Measures 
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When measured via process dissociation, the association between utilitarianism and 
antisocial personality traits disappeared: none of the correlations with the utilitarian PD 
parameter reached significance. Conversely, all three personality measures correlated 
negatively with the deontology PD parameter.
 1
 These findings clarify the ambiguity in 
previous findings regarding increased overt ‗utilitarian‘ judgments among people high in 
antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) or patients with damage to the 
VMPFC (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007). The current data suggest that people scoring higher 
in psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and meaninglessness were not experiencing stronger 
utilitarian moral inclinations. Rather, they were experiencing weaker deontological moral 
inclinations. In other words, these participants higher in antisocial personality traits cared 
less about the prohibition against causing the death of innocents. Accordingly, they 
appeared to make more utilitarian judgments, but this finding is better described as 
making fewer deontological judgments. Therefore, overt ‗utilitarian‘ responses on moral 
dilemmas may reflect genuine utilitarian inclinations, but they may also reflect other 
processes (e.g., selfishness), especially when competing deontological inclinations are 
relatively weak, as in the case of psychopaths or people with damage to the VMPFC 
(e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007; Saver & Damasio, 1991).  
3.4 Study 2 
Although Study 1 demonstrated that the association between utilitarian dilemma 
judgments and antisocial personality traits was driven by reduced deontological rather 
than enhanced utilitarian inclinations, the question remains whether utilitarian 
inclinations map onto traditional philosophical conceptions of utilitarianism (e.g., Kagan, 
1998; Mill, 1861/1998), which emphasize the maximization of outcomes despite the 
causing of harm. If so, utilitarian responses ought to correlate positively with various 
measures of prosocial motivation. Study 2 examined whether this is the case.   
3.4.1 Method 
Participants. Ninety-one participants (36 male, 54 female, 1 unreported) were recruited 
for payment via www.mturk.com: 69 Caucasian, 10 Black, 4 Asian, 3 Latino, 2 other 
ethnicity, and 3 unreported (Mage = 36.74, SD = 12.30).  
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Procedure and materials. Participants completed several measures of prosocial 
motivation and then responded to the same congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas in 
the same fixed random order as Study 1.  
Helping Scenarios. Participants read four brief vignettes where the protagonist requested 
mundane assistance, such as delivering a parcel 15 minutes out of your way (Conway & 
Peetz, 2012). Participants indicated the likelihood that they would help each protagonist 
on 7-point scales from not at all to very much (α = .64).    
Willingness to Volunteer Scale. Participants reported their willingness to volunteer for a 
worthy cause (Devoe & Pfeffer, 2007) by rating their agreement with five items such as 
Volunteering is a worthwhile use of my time even if I do not get paid on 7-point scales 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = .90).  
Charity Donation Task.  Participants were given an option to enter a dovert for US$50, 
and they indicated, if they won, how much money they would like donated on their 
behalf to four charities (UNICEF, The American Red Cross, The World Wildlife 
Federation, and a charity of their own choosing, Conway & Peetz, 2012). Sixty-six 
people entered the draw; 25 refused. 
Morality of Prosocial Behavior. Participants responded to nine prosocial dilemmas 
(eight adapted from Unger, 1996; one original) where protagonists considered actions 
that benefit others despite a cost to oneself (see Appendix 3A). Participants indicated the 
morality of each action on 7-point semantic differential scales ranging from morally bad 
to morally good. For example, in the yacht dilemma, participants indicated the morality 
of lying to a guard, then stealing and damaging their boss‘s yacht in order to save a 
drowning woman. We reverse-coded responses to the tsunami, envelope, resume, lost 
wallet, and stock tip dilemmas so that higher scores indicated approval of utilitarian 
action.  
We used three strategies to measure approval of prosociality. First, we summed approval 
of prosocial actions across all dilemmas (α = .51). Second, we conducted an exploratory 
factor analysis, which suggested that prosocial dilemmas loaded onto three separate 
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factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (see Table 4 for each dilemma‘s factor loadings 
on each varimax rotated factor). The factors were A) altruism dilemmas (yacht, lost little 
girl, architect, resume, α = .68) where the actor must choose between prosocial versus 
selfish options (e.g., risking one's life to save one's boss), B) honesty dilemmas (account, 
wallet, stock tip reverse-coded, α = .61) where the actor must decide whether to be honest 
or dishonest, and C) charity dilemmas, where the actor must decide whether or not to 
donate to a charity that will help many distant victims (envelope & tsunami, α = .67). 
Third, we examined approval for each dilemma separately.  
3.4.2 Results and Discussion 
As in Study 1, we calculated overt ‗utilitarian‘ judgments and both process dissociation 
parameters, and examined the correlations between these variables and each measure of 
prosocial motivation (see Table 5). Once again, overt ‗utilitarian‘ judgments correlated 
positively with the utilitarian PD parameter and negatively with the deontological PD 
parameter, but the parameters themselves were uncorrelated.   
As in Study 1, analyzing overt dilemma responses makes utilitarianism appear morally 
questionable, as ‗utilitarian‘ judgments were associated with reduced volunteerism and 
increased acceptance of dishonesty. However, these findings may reflect reduced 
prosociality among people who made more utilitarian judgments, or increased 
prosociality among people who made more deontological judgments. Process dissociation 
can disambiguate these possibilities.  
When assessed via process dissociation, the negative relation between utilitarianism and 
volunteerism disappeared, as did the relation between utilitarianism and acceptance of 
dishonesty.
2
 Instead, there was a significant positive relation between deontology and 
volunteerism, and deontology and honesty. These findings clarify that utilitarian 
inclinations do not reduce motivation to volunteer or be honest—rather, deontological 
inclinations increase motivation to volunteer and be honest. Moreover, process 
dissociation revealed an association between deontology and prosocial motivation on 
mundane helping scenarios (specifically, the account, wallet, and stock account  
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.75 .16 -.12 
Lost Little Girl Dilemma 
a 
.82 -.06 .17 
Architect Dilemma 
a 
.61 -.22 .20 
Resume Dilemma 
a 
.57 -.35 .21 
Account Dilemma 
b 
.15 .88 .01 
Wallet Dilemma 
b 
-.41 .62 .22 
Stock Tip Dilemma 
b 
.47 -.58 .36 
Envelope Dilemma 
c 
.06 .01 .83 
Tsunami Dilemma 
c 
.14 .01 .84 
 
Table 4: Factor Loadings of Judgments in Prosocial Dilemmas on Three Rotated Factors 
with Eigenvalues Greater than One in Exploratory Factor Analysis, Study 2(N = 91). 
 
Note: We selected an arbitrary criterion that judgments loading > ± .5 on a given factor 
meant that item was included in that factor. No item loaded on more than one factor. 
Dilemmas that share the same subscript comprise the factor with that subscript. The 
Stock Tip Dilemma loaded negatively on honesty factor, so it was recoded such that 
higher scores on all three honesty dilemmas reflected moral approval of dishonesty. 
However, there is an important difference: in the account and wallet dilemmas, honest 
answers benefit authority figures at a cost to victims, whereas in the stock tip dilemmas 
honesty harms an authority figure and benefits society—so dishonesty is not strictly 
utilitarian in this combination.  
  








PD Deontology  -.75***   
PD Utilitarianism   .64*** -.01  
Scenario Help -.14  .13  .28** 
Volunteerism  -.21*  .12  .38*** 
Charity Donations  .14  .00 -.16 
Gender (1 = male , 2 = female) -.41*** -.22*  .38*** 
Overall Dilemma Help          .10  .24*  .03 
Altruism Dilemmas 
a 
 .01  .28**  .17 
Honesty Dilemmas 
b 
 .28*         -.05         -.48*** 
Charity Dilemmas 
c 
-.03  .13  .09 
Yacht Dilemma 
a 
 .12  .24* -.03 
Lost Little Girl Dilemma 
a 
-.003  .27**  .18 
Architect Dilemma 
a 
-.13  .10  .23* 
Resume Dilemma 
a 
 .03  .21  .14 
Account Dilemma 
b 
 .31**  .04 -.37** 
Wallet Dilemma 
b 
 .14 -.11 -.29** 
Stock Tip Dilemma 
b 
 .16 -.06 -.29** 
Envelope Dilemma 
c 
 .01  .09  .02 
Tsunami Dilemma 
c 
-.05  .12  .14 
 
Table 5: Correlations between Traditional Bipolar Utilitarianism Scores, Process 
Dissociation Utilitarianism Scores, Process Dissociation Deontology Scores, and 
Prosocial Dependent Measures in Study 2 (N = 91). 
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* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note: Dilemmas that share the same subscript comprise the factor with that subscript  
Note: Stock Tip Dilemma loaded negatively on honesty factor, so it was recoded such 
that higher scores on all three honesty dilemmas reflected moral approval of dishonesty. 
However, there is an important difference: in the account and wallet dilemmas, honest 
answers benefit authority figures at a cost to victims, whereas in the stock tip dilemmas 
honesty harms an authority figure and benefits society—so dishonesty is not strictly 
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dilemmas) that was obscured in overt dilemma judgments. These findings suggest that 
deontological inclinations motivate prosociality in mundane situations, such as 
volunteering or doing modest favors for others.  
Process dissociation also revealed associations between utilitarianism and prosocial 
motivation that were obscured using overt judgments. Specifically, there was a positive 
relation between the utilitarian parameter and approval of costly prosocial actions overall. 
This finding was driven by the subset of dilemmas that loaded on the altruism factor 
(particularly, the yacht and lost little girl dilemmas). These findings suggest that 
utilitarian inclinations motivate prosociality in more extreme situations where someone‘s 
life may be at risk. Hence, utilitarianism and deontology each appear to motivate 
prosociality under different circumstances.  
Surprisingly, no relations emerged between either parameter and charity donations, or 
responses on charity dilemmas. Excluding participants who refused to enter the doverting 
did not alter this finding: none of the correlations reached significance (all rs < .10, all ps 
> .10). Perhaps utilitarianism would have predicted donations if we clarified that 
donations would save lives, or deontology would have predicted if we enhanced the 
emotional salience of victims. Future work could determine whether this is the case.  
3.5 General Discussion 
These two studies provide a clear account regarding the utilitarian and deontological 
inclinations that underpin judgments on traditional moral dilemmas. On the one hand, 
overt ‗utilitarian‘ judgments in Study 1 correlated with psychopathy, Machiavellianism, 
and meaninglessness (replicating Bartels, & Pizarro, 2011), as well as dishonesty and 
reduced volunteerism in Study 2. However, a process dissociation analysis revealed that 
the increased overt ‗utilitarian‘ responses expressed by people scoring high in antisocial 
personality traits in Study 1 were actually a function of reduced deontological 
inclinations, rather than increased utilitarian inclinations. Moreover, although overt 
‗utilitarian‘ judgments in Study 2 were associated with reduced volunteerism, process 
dissociation clarified that this finding was not because utilitarian inclinations are 
associated with reduced volunteerism; rather, deontological inclinations were associated 
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with increased volunteerism. In addition, utilitarian inclinations positively correlated with 
motivation to help on prosocial dilemmas—particularly those that involve making a 
substantial personal sacrifice to help another—whereas deontological inclinations were 
related to willingness to volunteer, mundane prosociality, and a desire for honesty (even 
honesty at a personal cost). Hence, utilitarianism and deontology each predict different 
kinds of prosociality.  
In Study 2, utilitarian inclinations were associated with stronger prosocial motivation in 
extreme, life-or-death scenarios where victims faced extreme harm (e.g., the yacht 
dilemma), whereas deontological inclinations were associated with prosocial motivation 
in mundane situations (e.g., delivering a parcel, volunteering). This suggests that 
mundane prosocial motivations might be stimulated by deontological inclinations—
theorized to involve empathy for/perspective-taking of a person in need—whereas 
extreme prosocial motivations are stimulated by utilitarian inclinations, theorized to 
involve a cognitive strategy of maximizing overall welfare. Future work should consider 
this possibility more systematically.  
The current findings suggest an explanation for why people high in antisocial personality 
traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) or damage to the VMPFC (Koenigs et al., 2007) make 
more utilitarian judgments. When faced with dilemmas that pit emotional reactions 
against deliberative reasoning, such people experience cognitive processing similar to 
other participants, coupled with reduced emotional processing. As a result, such decisions 
are improperly characterized as ‗more utilitarian‘ than controls, when they are more 
accurately described as ‗less deontological.‘ Accordingly, researchers should use caution 
when interpreting overt dilemma judgments: just because a given participant made many 
utilitarian judgments does not guarantee that they did so because they have strong 
utilitarian inclinations. Weak deontological inclinations can also produce a pattern of 
responding on moral dilemmas that erroneously appear to reflect strong utilitarian 
concerns.  
Note that these findings provide enhanced support for the dual process model than was 
previously available (Greene, 2007): if deontological judgments are driven by affective 
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reactions to harm, it makes sense that people who experience reduced affectivity are less 
motivated to make deontological judgments (rather than more motivated to make 
utilitarian judgments). Finally, these findings highlight the utility of process dissociation 
for clarifying the nature of moral inclinations underpinning overt dilemma judgments, 
which conflate the impact of each inclination. 
In sum, traditional measurement techniques have led researchers to conflate overt 
judgments on moral dilemmas with the inclinations underlying those judgments. The 
result of this error is theoretical confusion, such as unwittingly labeling people scoring 
high in antisocial personality traits as ‗more utilitarian.‘ In the current work, we 
employed process dissociation to clarify that (a) the link between overt ‗utilitarian‘ moral 
dilemma judgments and antisocial personality traits is spurious (it is not driven by 
increase utilitarian inclinations, but rather, by reduced deontological inclinations), and (b) 
that utilitarianism is positively related to some kinds of prosocial motivation (extreme 
circumstances), whereas deontology is related to other kinds of prosocial motivation 
(mundane circumstances). Researchers should exercise caution when interpreting overt 
dilemma judgments; a higher proportion of one kind of judgment need not imply the 
presence of a corresponding moral inclination.  
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 We replicated the finding that men scored higher on psychopathy than women (although 
no gender differences emerged for Machiavellianism or meaninglessness), and social 
desirability correlated negatively with all three personality measures. Moreover, men 
made more overt utilitarian judgments than women, an effect that PD revealed to be 
driven by increased deontological (but not utilitarian) concern among women. 
Additionally, people scoring higher in social desirability made fewer overt ‗utilitarian‘ 
judgments than people less concerned with social desirability, an effect that PD revealed 
to be driven by increased deontological (but not utilitarian) concern among those scoring 
higher in social desirability.  
To examine whether the relations between antisocial-personality traits and moral 
inclinations held above and beyond these factors, we separately regressed a) overt 
‗utilitarian‘ dilemma judgments, b) the utilitarian PD parameter, and c) the deontology 
PD parameter on each of our (centered) predictor variables while controlling for social 
desirability and gender (see Table 6). All three personality variables remained significant 
positive predictors of overt utilitarian judgments in this analysis. Moreover, all three 
personality variables remained significant negative predictors of the deontology PD 
parameter while controlling for social desirability and gender, and they did not become 
positive predictors of the utilitarian PD parameter in this analysis. Therefore, the relations 
between antisocial personality traits and reduced deontological inclinations cannot be 
attributed to gender or social desirability concerns.  
 
  











Machiavellianism          .39**          .02         -.22* 
Psychopathy          .33*         -.04         -.13 
No Meaning           .23*         -.14         -.22* 
Personality 
Measure 





Machiavellianism         -.05         -.88         -.01 
Psychopathy         -.24         -.20         -.09 
No Meaning          -.20         -.13         -.03 
Personality 
Measure 





Machiavellianism         -.49***         -.08          .23* 
Psychopathy         -.54***         -.06          .07 
No Meaning          -.36***          .11          .22* 
 
Table 1: Regressing Utilitarian Decisions, PD Utilitarianism Scores, and PD Deontology 
Scores on Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, and No Meaning, Controlling for Social 
Desirability and Gender in Study 1 (N = 89).   
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Gender coded 1 = male, 2 = female 
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As in Study 1, men were more likely to make utilitarian judgments than women, but this 
time a process dissociation analysis indicated that this relation obtained both due to 
increased deontological inclinations among women and increased utilitarian inclinations 
among men. In order to determine whether our findings obtained above and beyond 
gender, we separately regressed a) overt ‗utilitarian‘ dilemma judgments, b) the utilitarian 
PD parameter, and c) the deontology PD parameter on each of our (centered) predictor 
variables while controlling for gender (see Table 7).  
Overt ‗utilitarian‘ judgments were significantly predicted by gender, β = -.37, p<.001, 
and marginally predicted by charity donations, β = .18, p = .078, and approval of action 
in altruism dilemmas, β = .20, p = .069. Separately, we conducted identical analyses on 
the utilitarian and deontological PD parameters. Approval of action in altruism dilemmas 
remained a significant predictor of the utilitarian parameter, β = .30, p = .011, as did 
gender, β = -.27, p = .014. No other effects were significant (all ps < .1). Volunteering 
significantly predicted the deontology parameter, β = .23, p = .036, as did disapproval of 
dishonest action in the honesty dilemmas, β = -.25, p = .018, and gender, β = -.37, p < 
.001. No other effects were significant (all ps < .1).  
The results of this analysis were similar to the correlational analysis, with the exception 
that the relation between utilitarian responses and volunteerism no longer reached 
significance. Otherwise, the relations between overt dilemma decisions, process 
dissociation parameters, and prosocial variables remained significant. Therefore, these 
results cannot be attributed to the influence of gender.  
Finally, we conducted a multiple regression analysis where we simultaneously regressed 
utilitarian decisions on all prosocial variables and gender. In this analysis, only gender 
significantly predicted overt ‗utilitarian‘ dilemma judgments, β = -.37, p < .001, but 
charity donations, β = .18, p = .078, and altruism dilemmas, β = .20, p = .069, marginally 
predicted utilitarian judgments. No other effects were significant (all ps < .1). 
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Prosocial Measure β Overt ‘Utilitarian’ 
Dilemma Judgments 
β Gender 
Scenario Help               -.14         -.41*** 
Volunteerism                -.17         -.38*** 
Charity Donations                .14          -.41*** 
Overall Dilemma 
Help 
               .10          -.41*** 
Altruism Dilemmas                 .04          -.41*** 
Honesty Dilemmas                 .21*          -.35** 
Charity Dilemmas                -.02          -.41*** 
Prosocial Measure β Utilitarian PD 
Parameter 
β Gender 
Scenario Help                .13           -.22* 
Volunteerism                 .15           -.25* 
Charity Donations                .01           -.22* 
Overall Dilemma 
Help 
               .25*           -.24* 
Altruism Dilemmas                 .31**           -.26* 
Honesty Dilemmas                -.11           -.25* 
Charity Dilemmas                 .13            -.23* 
Prosocial Measure β Deontology PD 
Parameter 
β Gender 
Scenario Help                .28**            .37*** 
Volunteerism                 .34***            .32** 
Charity Donations               -.14            .38*** 
Overall Dilemma 
Help 
               .03            .38*** 
Altruism Dilemmas                 .16            .26** 
Honesty Dilemmas                -.39***            .28** 
Charity Dilemmas                 .09            .37*** 
Table 2: Regressing Utilitarian Decisions, PD Utilitarianism Scores, and PD Deontology 
Scores on Scenario Help, Volunteerism, Donations, Dilemma Help, help on Altruism, 
Honesty, and Charity Dilemmas, and Gender in Study 2 (N = 91).   
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Appendix 3A: Prosocial Dilemmas 
Please read each of the following scenarios and tell us how morally good or bad the action 
is, in your opinion.  
Account 
You work for a large accounting firm whose clients include a certain billionaire. You know 
he gives a lot of money to several fashionable charities, but does hardly anything to aid the 
world‘s neediest people. You find out that you can decrease by only a million dollars, the 
billionaire‘s huge account without it ever being noticed: Through a sequence of many small 
anonymous contributions, the million will go to an international aid organization and, as a 
result, ten thousand fewer children will die in the next few months. You shift the funds and 
ten thousand more children are saved. 
Tsunami 
You‘re visiting a friend‘s office who does research on beach erosion in a region of Asia. He 
has a webcam overlooking the beach, so he can monitor the site while in the U.S. He is 
showing web feed, when you suddenly see a wave approaching the beach, resulting from a 
tsunami. You watch, as the waves smash the village of a few thousand people, destroying 
property and killing many people instantly. Later that day, you get an email from an 
international aid organization that you trust. It says a donation of $100 made through its 
website will be deployed almost instantaneously to provide lifesaving food and medical 
care to ten people. However, you decide not to donate money. 
Yacht 
You have a summer job working on the waterfront estate of a billionaire. Through 
binoculars, you see a woman out in the waves who will drown unless you help her now. To 
rescue her, you must steal your boss‘ yacht, which is worth millions of dollars. To steal the 
yacht, you will have to lie to the guard watching the dock. And if you go, you‘ll have to 
pass through a channel where the yacht will be damaged. You‘re not rich, so you won‘t be 
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able to help much with the repair bill that, even after insurance, will be over a million 
dollars. Still, you take the yacht and save the woman.  
Envelope 
You receive a letter from an international aid organization.  You respect the organization 
for the work they do and for their reputation of honesty, efficiency in delivering aid and 
commitment. The letter tells you about an epidemic in Africa that is causing many children 
to die from dehydration. A simple treatment called ―oral rehydration therapy‖ can save 
these children‘s lives. You read that a $100 contribution will save the lives of thirty 
children. An addressed envelope is enclosed, making it easy to send your check. But you 
throw the envelope in the trash, and instead of living many years, thirty more children soon 
die than would have if you had contributed $100.  
Lost Little Girl  
You are trespassing on a farmer‘s private property in order to harvest some rare plants that 
grow there. It is well known that the farmer does not like people harvesting plants on his 
property. He has put up large signs warning that trespassers will be prosecuted. In a dense 
forested area you find the farmer‘s young daughter alone, lost, and crying. You are so far 
from civilization that she is unlikely to be found by any search parties for days. You decide 
to lead the little girl back to her father even though you will have to admit that you were 
trespassing on his land. Is it appropriate for you to save the little girl even if it means you 
might be prosecuted for trespassing?  
Architect  
 You are a young architect visiting one of your construction sites with your boss.  Your 
boss is a well-liked individual who has many friends in the business and community. One 
day at a building you are inspecting he slips and starts to fall off the roof. You could reach 
out and pull him back to safety, but there is a chance you might start to fall too. Is it 
appropriate for you to lean out to save your boss if it means risking your life in the process?  
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Resume 
You have a friend who is looking for a job.  He looks at his resume and thinks that it is not 
quite strong enough to get the position that he really wants. He considers putting some false 
information on his resume in order to make it more impressive.  By doing this he may 
manage to get hired, beating out several candidates who are actually more qualified than 
he. In the end, though, he decides to leave it the way it is even if that means he is less likely 
to get hired. Is it appropriate for your friend to be truthful on his resume even if he is less 
likely to get the position he wants?  
Lost Wallet  
You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet lying on the ground.  You 
open the wallet and find that it contains over a thousand dollars in cash as well the owner‘s 
driver‘s license. You recognize the owner of the wallet as a businessman who is famously 
rich and greedy. He recently fired many people in town from their jobs. You consider 
sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash and distributing it among those 
people recently fired by the business man. But the owner of lost property deserves to get 
that property back intact, so you consider contacting the businessman to give him back 
everything. Is it appropriate for you give back the money in the wallet if it could have 
helped people fired by the wallet‘s owner?  
Stock Tip 
You are a management consultant working on a case for a large corporate client.  Your 
boss has access to confidential information that would be very useful to investors.  One 
night you catch him leaking information in return for large sums of money.  Releasing 
information in this way is strictly forbidden by federal law. Your first instinct is to tell 
everything to federal investigators. But then you realize that if you did so, you would 
probably lose your job and never be hired again in the industry. Also your boss would be 
very angry with you when he got out of jail. Is it appropriate for you to inform federal 
investigators if it means you will likely lose your job?   
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Chapter 4  
4 Conclusions General and Discussion  
Together, the three studies reported in Chapter 2 and two studies reported in Chapter 3 
provide improved understanding of the psychology of moral judgments. Chapter 2 
presented three studies that validated the application of Jacoby‘s (1991) process 
dissociation procedure to moral judgments, thereby allowing for independent estimates of 
deontology and utilitarianism and overcoming the non-independence error that plagues 
other moral dilemma research. By measuring each inclination separately, it becomes 
possible to determine the degree to which each contributes to moral judgments. The 
utility of this technique was further documented in Chapter 3, where process dissociation 
clarified theoretical confusions in the field, specifically the relations between deontology, 
utilitarianism, antisocial personality traits, and prosociality.  
4.1 Results 
Let‘s begin with a review of the results of each study in turn, beginning with Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) Studies 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 3 and continuing through Conway, 
Bartels, and Pizarro (under review) Studies 1 and 2 in Chapter 3.  
4.1.1 Results: Chapter 2, Study 1 
In Chapter 2, three studies examined the validity of process dissociation for measuring 
the processes involved in moral dilemma judgments. The predominant dual-process 
model of moral judgments (Greene, 2007) postulates that deontological moral 
judgments—refusing to cause harm even when harm will lead to the best overall 
outcome—are driven by affective reactions to harm, whereas utilitarian moral 
judgments—acting to produce the best overall outcome, even if that entails causing 
harm—are driven by cognitive evaluations of outcomes. Although a large and growing 
body of research supports this theory (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Suter & Hertwig, 
2010), researchers have typically measured deontology and utilitarianism by pitting one 
against the other. Therefore, it remains unclear whether overt moral judgments are 
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actually driven by one process, the other process, or a combination of the two; a single-
process account cannot be ruled out.  
Process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) allows for the independent assessment of each 
process by pitting deontology against utilitarianism in some dilemmas, whereas in other 
dilemmas deontology accords with utilitarianism. By assessing responses on both types 
of dilemmas, it is possible to mathematically isolate and estimate each process: the 
deontology and utilitarian parameters. These parameters may be compared with overt 
judgments, one another, and third variables, in order to clarify the underlying relations 
between these constructs. In addition, it is also possible to manipulate variables that 
accord with theoretical conceptions of each process, in order to determine whether these 
manipulations affect the parameters independently of one another. If the parameters 
correlate sensibly with overt judgments and third variables, and are selectively impacted 
by theoretically-derived manipulations, this would suggest that the parameters are 
accurately assessing deontology and utilitarianism. The three studies reported in Chapter 
2 did exactly this.  
Study 1 in Chapter 2 examined the correlations between overt moral judgments, the 
deontology and utilitarian process dissociation parameters, and a number of individual 
difference measures: empathy and perspective-taking, need for cognition, faith in 
intuition, moral identity (internalization), and religiosity. Results suggested that the 
deontological and utilitarian parameters did, indeed, relate sensibly to overt moral 
judgments: the more overt ―deontological‖ moral judgments (i.e., fewer ―utilitarian‖ 
overt moral judgments) participants made, the higher they scored on the deontological 
parameter, whereas the fewer overt ―deontological‖ moral judgments (i.e., more 
―utilitarian‖ overt moral judgments) participants made, the higher they scored on the 
utilitarian parameter. Moreover, the two parameters themselves were not significantly 
correlated, suggesting that deontology and utilitarianism do, indeed, reflect independent 
constructs, in line with the dual-process model (Greene, 2007).  
In terms of relations with third variables, ―deontological‖ overt moral judgments (i.e., 
reduced ―utilitarian‖ overt moral judgments) were positively correlated with empathic 
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concern and perspective-taking. The deontological parameter also correlated positively 
with both these constructs, whereas the utilitarian parameter did not significantly 
correlate with either. This finding is consistent with the dual-process model whereby 
deontology is primarily driven by an affective reaction to harm—which ought to be 
stronger in individuals higher in empathy and perspective-taking—whereas utilitarianism 
is primarily driven by cognitive processes unrelated to these constructs. In addition, 
―deontological‖ overt moral judgments (i.e., reduced ―utilitarian‖ overt moral judgments) 
were negatively correlated with need for cognition. This time, the deontological 
parameter was unrelated to need for cognition, whereas the utilitarian parameter was 
positively related. This pattern is consistent with the theoretical position that 
utilitarianism is driven by cognitive evaluations of outcomes. ―Deontological‖ overt 
moral judgments (i.e., reduced ―utilitarian‖ overt moral judgments) were also positively 
correlated with religiosity, and process dissociation again clarified the nature of these 
relations: the deontological parameter was positively correlated, but the utilitarian 
parameter was uncorrelated, with this construct. This was an exploratory analysis, so it 
does not necessarily corroborate or refute the dual-process model per se, but it reinforces 
the conclusion that the parameters are tapping independent constructs that are conflated 
in overt moral judgments.  
Finally, the most interesting pattern emerged for moral identity: there was no significant 
correlation between moral identity and overt dilemma judgments; however, both 
parameters positively correlated with moral identity. This finding has two implications: 
first, it suggests that because overt moral judgments conflate deontology and 
utilitarianism, process dissociation can uncover parallel relations with third variables that 
are cancelled out when these processes are conflated. Second, this finding suggests that 
both deontology and utilitarianism are genuinely moral processes. Without this evidence, 
it might be possible to assume that utilitarianism is a process entailing morally-neutral 
calculations; this evidence suggests that utilitarianism is calculation for moral ends. To 
the author‘s knowledge, this is the first evidence to suggest there is something genuinely 
moral about utilitarianism, a proposition which had been in doubt (see Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011). Moreover, this conclusion was reinforced by the findings regarding the relation 
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between utilitarianism and prosocial motivations from Study 2, Chapter 3, which will be 
discussed below.  
In sum, Study 1 in Chapter 2 suggested that the deontological and utilitarian parameters 
are tracking primarily affective and primarily cognitive processes, respectively, and 
clarify the relations between overt moral judgments and individual differences by 
delineating when these relations may be attributed to one process, when to another, and 
when to both. That said, these findings are merely correlational in nature. Although a 
regression analysis confirmed that the obtained relations remained when controlling for 
the relation with both parameters simultaneously, stronger evidence that deontology and 
utilitarianism are, indeed, distinct processes would be obtained if we manipulated 
theoretically-relevant variables and observed impacts on one but not the other parameter. 
Hence, Studies 2 and 3 in Chapter 2 did exactly that.  
4.1.2 Results: Chapter 2, Studies 2 & 3  
In Study 2, Chapter 2, we manipulated cognitive load. Previous work has suggested that 
inducing cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008) or time pressure (Suter and Hertwig, 2011) 
impairs utilitarian responding, which is consistent with the dual-process model, where 
utilitarian judgments are theorized to result primarily from a cognitive evaluation of 
outcomes. However, previous work suffers from the non-independence error, so it cannot 
rule out whether load actually facilitates deontology, or perhaps impacts both deontology 
and utilitarianism. We found that cognitive load reduced the number of overt utilitarian 
judgments (i.e., increased the number of overt deontological judgments), but process 
dissociation clarified the nature of this effect: cognitive load selectively reduced the 
utilitarian parameter without impacting the deontological parameter. This finding 
provides the best evidence to date that utilitarianism is, indeed, linked to cognitive 
evaluations of outcomes, and is independent from deontology.  
In Study 3, Chapter 2, we manipulated the salience of harm by including a photo of the 
victim. Previous work (e.g., Bartels, 2008) has suggested a link between making harm 
vivid and increased deontological judgments; however, this work suffers from the non-
independence error, and therefore cannot rule out that making harm salient may also 
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reduce utilitarianism or affect both processes. We found that making harm salient did, 
indeed, increase overt ―deontological‖ judgments (i.e., reduced overt ―utilitarian‖ 
judgments), but process dissociation clarified the nature of this effect: making harm 
salient selectively increased the deontological parameter without impacting the utilitarian 
parameter. These findings provide the best evidence to date that deontology is driven 
primarily by an affective reaction to harm, and operates independently of utilitarianism.  
Together the three studies reported in Chapter 2 validate process dissociation as an 
improved methodology for independently quantifying deontology and utilitarianism, 
providing the best evidence to date that they are independent processes, that utilitarianism 
is linked to cognition and deontology to affect, and that both are truly moral in nature.  
4.1.3 Results: Chapter 3, Studies 1 & 2  
Having validated process dissociation as an improved tool for measuring deontology and 
utilitarianism, we now looked to see whether process dissociation could help clarify 
theoretical ambiguity in the field in Chapter 3. The first problem we examined was that of 
antisocial personality traits. Several lines of work have linked antisocial personality traits 
to increased utilitarian responding, whether those traits are measured as individual 
differences in psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and (life) meaninglessness in the general 
population (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), or whether those traits arise through damage to 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, resulting in a pattern of behavior characterized as 
acquired sociopathy that entails a callous disregard for the wellbeing of others (Koenigs 
et al., 2007; Saver & Damasio, 1991). Yet, those studies suffer from the non-
independence error, and therefore cannot determine whether people with antisocial 
personality traits experience stronger utilitarian inclinations, weaker deontological 
inclinations, or some combination thereof. In Study 1, Chapter 3, we attempted to 
replicate Bartels and Pizarro while employing process dissociation in order to clarify the 
nature of the relations between antisocial personality traits and utilitarianism.  
The results of Study 1, Chapter 3 replicated those of Bartels and Pizarro when examining 
overt judgments: people scoring higher in psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and 
meaninglessness made more overt ―utilitarian‖ judgments (i.e., fewer overt 
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―deontological‖ judgments). However, process dissociation clarified the underlying 
nature of this effect: when measured via the utilitarian parameter, the relations between 
all three individual difference variables and utilitarianism disappeared. Instead, all three 
personality variables correlated negatively with the deontology parameter. This finding 
suggests that people with antisocial personality traits do not experience greater utilitarian 
moral inclinations than other people; rather, they experience weaker deontological 
inclinations! Note that these findings were similar but weaker when we employed a 
regression analysis that assessed the effect of each personality trait controlling for the 
other traits, as well as controlling for social desirability and gender (in line with Bartels 
and Pizarro).  
The findings of Study 1, Chapter 3 resolve theoretical confusion in the field: whereas 
previous work had characterized people with antisocial personality traits as ―more 
utilitarian,‖ this does not fit with the dual-process model of moral judgments. Recall that 
utilitarianism is theorized to be driven primarily by cognitive evaluations of outcomes, 
whereas deontology is theorized to be driven primarily by affective reactions to harm. 
The antisocial personality traits examined here—particularly psychopathy—are 
characterized by equivalent levels of cognitive abilities compared to control participants, 
coupled with severe deficits in affect (Koenigs et al., 2007). Therefore, the dual-process 
model suggests that people with antisocial personality traits ought to experience less 
deontology but no less utilitarianism; this is exactly what we found. Process dissociation 
clarified the theoretical ambiguity of previous work by delineating the relation of each 
moral inclination to antisocial personality traits, further corroborating the dual-process 
model.  
The final theoretical puzzle we examined was that of prosociality. Thus far, work on 
moral dilemmas has characterized utilitarianism as a willingness to cause harm in order 
to achieve the best overall outcome. While causing harm to achieve the best overall 
outcome does qualify as utilitarian motivation according to moral philosophers, it is an 
impoverished view of the nature of utilitarianism (Kagan, 1998; Mill, 1861/1998). True 
utilitarianism entails a focus on maximizing outcomes regardless of whether or not it is 
necessary to cause harm in order to achieve those outcomes. If psychologists are 
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genuinely tapping utilitarian moral inclinations, then utilitarianism ought to be associated 
with motivation to engage in prosocial behavior. To the author‘s knowledge, no work to 
date has examined whether this is, indeed, the case. Therefore, we resolved to examine 
the relations between deontology, utilitarianism, and prosocial motivation in Study 2, 
Chapter 3.  
The results of Study 2, Chapter 3 indicated no significant relation between overt 
―utilitarian‖ (i.e., less overt ―deontological‖) moral judgments on two of the three 
measures of prosocial motivation employed in the study. However, as we saw with the 
correlations between deontology, utilitarianism, and moral identity in Study 1, Chapter 2, 
null findings using overt judgments may be masking significant findings with the 
underlying parameters that do not shine through when deontology and utilitarianism are 
conflated. The one significant effect was a negative correlation between overt 
―utilitarian‖ (i.e., less ―deontological‖) moral judgments and volunteerism. Taken at face 
value, this finding would suggest that the more participants made utilitarian judgments, 
the less motivated they were to volunteer. In other words, using overt judgments alone, 
utilitarianism does not look like an especially moral motivation; if anything, it looks like 
an amoral or even anti-moral motivation. Moreover, using overt judgments, there is no 
evidence that deontology entails prosocial motivation, unless one interprets the effect of 
volunteerism as reflecting greater motivation to volunteer among people who make more 
overt deontological judgments. Due to the non-independence error, this is only one of 
several possible interpretations.  
Yet, the process dissociation results indicate a very different pattern of findings. When 
utilitarianism is measured via process dissociation, the negative relation with 
volunteerism disappears, becoming a null effect. Moreover, the correlation between the 
utilitarian parameter and prosocial decisions on the prosocial dilemmas was significant, 
suggesting that people who experience more utilitarian inclinations are more motivated to 
help others at a personal cost after all. This finding not only demonstrates how overt 
dilemma judgments can be misleading, it also enhances our understanding of 
utilitarianism. It suggests that utilitarianism is, in fact, not simply a motivation to harm 
others in order to achieve the best overall outcome—utilitarianism also entails a 
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willingness to make personal sacrifices to achieve the best overall outcome. This finding 
also accords with the finding from Study 1, Chapter 1, where the utilitarian parameter 
correlated positively with moral identity: both findings suggest there is something 
genuinely moral about utilitarianism. However, the utilitarian parameter did not 
significantly relate to prosocial motivations in the mundane helping scenarios or 
volunteerism. Thus, it may be that utilitarianism motivates some kinds of prosociality 
more than others.  
When deontology is measured via process dissociation, the negative correlation between 
overt ―utilitarian‖ judgments and volunteerism becomes clear: whereas volunteerism was 
not significantly correlated with the utilitarian parameter, it was positively correlated with 
the deontological parameter. This suggests that people who experienced stronger 
deontological inclinations also demonstrated stronger motivation to volunteer. Moreover, 
the deontology parameter also correlated positively with willingness to help in mundane 
helping scenarios. This finding corroborates the interpretation that deontology, as well as 
utilitarianism, motivates prosocial behavior. However, deontology did not correlate with 
prosocial decisions on the prosocial dilemmas. Thus, it may be that deontology motivates 
some kinds of prosociality more than others.  
Finally, the prosocial dilemmas may be further broken down via factor analysis. Doing so 
reveals that not all prosocial dilemmas are the same; they cluster into three factors: 
altruism dilemmas, where actors must make a substantial, possibly fatal personal sacrifice 
in order to save one or more victims in grave peril, honesty dilemmas, where actors must 
decide whether to remain honest at a personal cost, or whether to act dishonestly for 
personal gain, and charity dilemmas, where actors must decide whether to donate money 
to a charity instead of spending it on the self. This analysis reveals interesting patterns: 
the relation between utilitarianism and prosocial motivation on prosocial dilemmas 
overall holds only for the altruism dilemmas: people scoring higher on the utilitarian 
parameter also demonstrated greater willingness to make a substantial personal sacrifice 
to save someone in dire straits; the deontology parameter was unrelated to decisions on 
altruism dilemmas. However, the deontology parameter correlated negatively with 
honesty dilemmas. This finding indicates that people scoring higher on the deontology 
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parameter were more likely to opt for honesty even when this imposes substantial costs 
on the self (e.g., failing to get hired). It is interesting that the utilitarian parameter failed 
to correlate with these dilemmas. This null effect suggests that utilitarianism is not about 
simply accepting the best outcome—when the ―best outcome‖ benefits only the self, 
rather than attaining the best overall outcome for everyone in a situation, utilitarianism is 
no longer predictive. This further corroborates the view that utilitarianism is a genuinely 
moral motivation, rather than merely amoral outcome calculation. Finally, neither the 
deontology nor utilitarian parameters correlated significantly with charity dilemmas.  
Considering the overall relations between deontology and utilitarianism with various 
prosocial measures, an interesting distinction emerges: deontology correlated positively 
with prosocial motivation in the mundane helping scenarios and the volunteerism scale; 
utilitarianism correlated positively with helping in the extreme altruism dilemmas. This 
pattern suggests not only that both parameters are tapping moral motivations, but that 
they are different kinds of moral motivations, or motivations that arise under different 
circumstances: deontology is predictive of moral motivation in mundane circumstances 
where help comes at a modest personal cost and will provide a modest benefit to the 
recipient, whereas utilitarianism is predictive of helping when there is a large personal 
cost and help will benefit recipients substantially. It remains unclear whether deontology 
and utilitarianism are tracking the relative costs to oneself, the relative benefits to others, 
or some other features of these different scenarios. However, this pattern suggests that 
people experience different prosocial motivations in different circumstances. Perhaps 
prosociality in mundane circumstances (e.g., doing a favor for a co-worker) is motivated 
by an affective reaction to the person‘s need, whereas prosociality in extreme, life-or-
death circumstances is motivated by consideration of the outcomes of action. This 
interpretation should be considered preliminary, but suggests an interesting distinction. 
Future work should examine whether this distinction is effective in motivating different 
kinds of actual prosocial behavior.  
4.2 Implications 
The current findings have implications for the dual-process model of moral judgments, 
the moral status of utilitarianism, and the interpretation of previous findings.  
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4.2.1 Implications: Dual-Process Model 
The current findings have implications for the dual process model of moral judgments: 
they suggest that Greene and colleagues (2001) may be correct in their assertion that 
affective reactions to harm primarily drive judgments that harm is not acceptable, 
whereas cognitive deliberation primarily leads to judgments that harm is acceptable when 
it maximizes outcomes. Note that in the current studies, the utilitarian and deontological 
parameters were not, themselves, correlated (except a modest positive correlation in one 
case), yet each parameter correlated in expected directions with overt moral judgments. 
Moreover, the parameters may be manipulated independently, suggesting that one 
parameter mainly taps affective reactions to harm, whereas the other parameter mainly 
taps cognitive deliberation regarding outcomes—as predicted by the dual-process model. 
Indeed, these findings are inconsistent with single-process accounts (e.g., Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011).  
Recall that moral dilemma paradigm arose as a framework for integrating both cognition 
and emotion in moral judgments when other paradigms of the era argued that only one or 
the other was necessary and sufficient. Yet, as previous work was vulnerable to the dual-
process error, it could not effectively rule out the possibility that a single process drove 
all dilemma judgments. Process dissociation helps overcome the non-independence error 
in previous dilemma research by measuring each parameter independently, and confirms 
that there appear to be at least two distinct processes in play when people make moral 
judgments. Therefore, given this data, it seems reasonable to continue research within the 
dual-process paradigm for the time being, rather than revert back to a debate regarding 
whether mostly visceral, affect-laden forces or mostly rational deliberation drives moral 
judgments.  
4.2.2 Implications: Moral Status of Utilitarianism 
These findings also have implications regarding the moral status of utilitarianism. Despite 
eloquent arguments for utilitarian ethics from moral philosophers (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998), 
the moral status of utilitarianism was in some doubt given recent evidence that utilitarian 
judgments are favored by people with antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 
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2011) and brain damage that impairs their social emotions (Koenigs et al., 2007). Note 
that we replicated these findings using overt dilemma judgments: people with antisocial 
personality traits made more utilitarian overt judgments (i.e., fewer deontological overt 
judgments). However, process dissociation analysis clarified the underlying relations: the 
utilitarian parameter did not significantly correlate with Machiavellianism, psychopathy, 
or meaninglessness. Rather, each of these individual difference variables correlated 
negatively with the deontology parameter. These findings confirm what Bartels and 
Pizarro, as well as Koenigs and colleagues, argued but could not determine in their own 
studies: the reason people scoring higher on antisocial traits favor utilitarian judgments is 
not because they experience stronger utilitarian inclinations; rather it is because they 
experience weaker deontological inclinations. This result is consistent with research on 
the nature of psychopathy and damage in ventromedial brain regions, given that such 
individuals demonstrate equivalent cognitive performance to control subjects despite 
profound emotional deficits (Saver & Damasio, 1991; Cleckley, 1955).  This finding also 
helps resolve why people scoring lower on empathic concern also make more utilitarian 
overt moral judgments (Gleichgerrcht, & Young, 2013).  Finally, these results clarify that 
the utilitarian inclinations are not to be confused with a psychopathic perspective on 
human life. Mill (1861/1998) argued that utilitarianism implies a deep and abiding 
respect for human life, whereas psychopaths generally lack respect for human life 
(Cleckley, 1955).  
Consistent with Mill‘s perspective that utilitarianism entails a moral position, the 
utilitarian parameter correlated positively with moral identity (internalization)—a 
measure of the degree to which morality forms part of the core self-concept (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002). Moral identity predicts a variety of prosocial outcomes such as increased 
charity donations, decreased prejudice, and decreased cheating (for a review, see Shao, 
Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Intriguingly, the deontology parameter also correlated 
positively with moral identity, yet there was no significant correlation between moral 
identity and overt dilemma judgments. Thus, a process dissociation approach clarifies 
that utilitarianism may be a moral inclination after all, despite more overt utilitarian 
judgments among moral questionable individuals and a lack of relation between overt 
judgments and moral identity.  
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4.2.3 Implications: Interpreting Previous Results 
Finally, these findings help resolve theoretical confusion regarding the nature of 
deontology and utilitarianism. Because overt, bi-polar moral judgments conflate 
judgments with the processes underlying judgments, interpreting them can be difficult. 
This was particularly true when researchers administered moral dilemmas to patients with 
brain damage in the VMPFC or people with antisocial personality traits (e.g., Koenigs et 
al., 2007, Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). When such participants make more ‗utilitarian‘ 
judgments than other participants, what are we to make of this finding? Does it reflect 
powerful utilitarian inclinations, weak deontological ones, or some other possibility? 
Koenigs and colleagues titled their paper Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases 
utilitarian moral judgments. Is that the best way to characterize their results, given that 
increased utilitarian judgments are conflated with reduced deontological judgments? 
Our findings suggest that increased utilitarian judgments results are due reduced 
deontological inclinations: people high on antisocial personality traits cared less about 
harm, and therefore experienced a weaker reaction to the thought of harm, which 
manifested as weaker deontological (but not utilitarian) inclinations. These findings are 
consistent with neuroimaging work demonstrating that people scoring higher in 
psychopathy demonstrated educed activation in the amygdala while reading moral 
dilemmas (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009). Therefore, perhaps Koenigs and colleagues 
should have titled their paper Damage to the prefrontal cortex reduces deontological 
moral judgments. To be fair, they and others have argued for this interpretation, but were 
unable to determine whether it was correct (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Greene, 2007a; 
Koenigs et al., 2007).   
Moreover, the present results may clear up a misconception in the literature: the role of 
moral identity in moral judgments. Recently, Glenn, Koleva, Iyer, Graham, and Ditto 
(2010) measured psychopathy, moral identity, and moral judgments. They found the 
usual pattern: people scoring higher on psychopathy made more overt ‗utilitarian‘ 
judgments. They also found, unsurprisingly, a negative correlation between psychopathy 
and moral identity (as moral identity is designed as a measure of the moral self-concept 
and predicts prosocial behavior, e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002). Next, the researchers 
THE PROCESS DISSOCIATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT 102 
 
examined whether moral identity mediated the relation between psychopathy and 
utilitarian judgment—but moral identity failed to correlate with utilitarian judgments. 
They argued ―these results suggest that psychopathy is independently related to both a 
weaker moral identity as well as to more utilitarian moral judgment‖ (Glenn et al., 2010, 
p. 502).  
There is another possible interpretation, however. Recall that there was no correlation 
between moral judgments and moral identity in Conway and Gawronski, Study 1, either. 
Yet, when measured via process dissociation, we found that moral identity was correlated 
with both the deontological and utilitarian parameters. This suggested that overt moral 
judgments obscure the true, positive relations between moral identity and both utilitarian 
and deontological inclinations. Moreover, recall in Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro, Study 
4, we found that people scoring higher in psychopathy made more utilitarian 
judgments—an effect driven not by stronger utilitarian inclinations, but weaker 
deontological ones. Together, these findings suggest that moral identity might mediate 
the relation between psychopathy and the deontological parameter (and, thereby, moral 
judgments). This is an example of how process dissociation can provide improved 
methodological resolution to examine empirical claims, which ultimately has bearing on 
theoretical models of the nature of human moral psychology.   
4.3 Limitations 
The current work employed the now-common paradigm of providing participants with 
hypothetical scenarios and asking for judgments (some researchers ask for hypothetical 
behavioral responses; results tend to be similar, cf. Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 
2013). There are various disadvantages to such a paradigm: the dilemmas entail decisions 
between extreme actions (e.g., killing people; letting people die) in unlikely situations 
(e.g., time travel, paint bombs) of a hypothetical nature, wherein unrealistic actions occur 
(e.g., a single person‘s falling body is capable of stopping a moving train). In short, moral 
dilemmas are absurd. The vagaries of moral dilemma research stem from its intellectual 
lineage as thought experiments in philosophy, in which realism is not a concern. Had 
psychologists invented the source material, rather than co-opted it from philosophy, 
perhaps researchers would ask participants to make decisions grounded in more realistic 
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scenarios. Given that this is not the case, the field is open to a number of criticisms. Each 
of these criticisms is valid, although they pertain to the entire moral dilemma paradigm 
rather than the current work exclusively. Nonetheless, it may be that none of the 
criticisms is strong enough to warrant disregarding the paradigm or empirical conclusions 
stemming from moral dilemma research.  
First, critics have pointed out that participants may misjudge their actual reactions should 
they encounter circumstances like moral dilemmas in real life. This is almost certainly 
true: real life situations may involve far stronger visceral reactions than hypothetical 
scenarios given that harm should be considerably more salient in real life. Therefore, in 
real life people may be more likely to view harm as unacceptable. Indeed, a wealth of 
evidence supports this view: increasing the salience, vividness, or realism of harm tends 
to increase judgments that harm is not acceptable (Amit & Greene, 2012; Bartels, 2008), 
due to increased deontological inclinations evoked by visual imagery of the victim 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013, Study 3). Moreover, when researchers attempted to 
increase the realism of moral dilemmas through such methods as employing virtual 
reality technology, participants who experienced stronger autonomic arousal made more 
judgments that harm is not acceptable (Navarette, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2011). 
Therefore, it may be that hypothetical scenarios underestimate the degree to which people 
are harm averse.  
On the other hand, it may not be the case that the hypothetically of moral dilemmas 
systematically underestimates deontology. Navarette and colleagues (2011) pointed out 
that in their virtual reality trolley dilemmas, the modal response to the trolley problem 
was still utilitarian. Therefore, even in realistic scenarios, if people can suppress their 
affective reactions, they may be able to act in ways that maximize the good even when 
doing so requires causing harm. Accordingly, police, soldiers, and emergency first 
responders commonly receive training on how to minimize emotional reactions in the 
face of traumatic events in order to keep a ‗cool head‘ in dangerous and chaotic 
situations.   
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In any event, given that the field has concerned itself with responses evoked by different 
variants of dilemmas, a main effect of increased deontology in ‗real life‘ settings does not 
endanger conclusions regarding the interaction between circumstances and 
deontology/utilitarianism—these conclusions remain valid, even if all decisions would 
shift closer to harm aversion in real-world situations. If emotionally evocative versions of 
dilemmas elicit stronger deontological but not utilitarian reasoning, whereas cognitive 
load impairs utilitarian but not deontological inclinations, then we are learning something 
about the structure of moral psychology.  
It is also worth considering whether moral dilemmas are truly as hypothetical as they 
seem. O‘Neill and Petrinovich (1998) pointed out,  
―[Moral] dilemmas are not removed totally from the kinds of decisions 
policymakers sometimes have to make… In World War II, the British government 
had to decide whether or not to lure German bombers from highly populated 
London to less densely populated Kent, Surrey, or Sussex. The British 
government faced the following dilemma: Is it permissible to sacrifice a fewer 
number of individuals and save a greater number of individuals in the process? It 
was decided that it was morally impermissible to sacrifice fewer numbers of 
innocent people to save a greater number‖ (p. 362).   
Closer to home, the Government of Manitoba recently faced the difficult decision of 
whether to intentionally divert the flooding Red River to destroy approximately 100 
homes, or to allow the river to flood naturally, thereby destroying approximately 1000 
homes. Ultimately, the government decided to embark on a program of intentional 
flooding (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011, May 13). Such a decision was 
parallel to the structure of moral dilemmas, even if the emotional stakes were lower (loss 
of property rather than life in this case).  
Yet, there are many other cases that parallel moral dilemmas, ranging from triage of 
patients following a disaster, to assassination of political targets who cause strife (e.g., 
Osama bin Laden), to economic decisions (e.g., is it acceptable to fire some employees in 
order to save the company, thereby keeping the majority employed?). In fact, moral 
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dilemmas have been common in history: was it immoral for Ghengis Khan to destroy one 
city to facilitate the peaceful surrender of many others? Was it immoral for a dictator to 
impose Communism on the Russian people if it enabled them to industrialize and win the 
war? Was it immoral for America to drop the atomic bomb if it avoided many further 
casualties in combat? In each case, deontological and utilitarian positions disagree. 
Therefore, although moral dilemmas are themselves hypothetical, they parallel the 
structure of some real life situations. Therefore, by exploring the psychological factors 
that give rise to hypothetical moral judgments, we may gain insight into the factors that 
influence these real-life judgments.  
If some real life dilemmas operate similarly to moral dilemmas, then people‘s answers to 
these real life questions may vary depending on (a) the degree of affect-laden reaction 
they experience, plus (b) the degree to which they deliberate regarding outcomes. 
Considering that victims often have stronger reactions to harm than perpetrators do 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990), it may be that victims and perpetrators make 
systematically different moral judgments above and beyond self-serving bias (Epley & 
Dunning, 2001). This would be an interesting application of moral dilemma research. 
There is already some evidence for this perspective: third party observers who identify 
more with the victims than the perpetrators react more strongly to infractions, and have 
more difficulty forgiving transgressors (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008). Hopefully 
research will continue in this vein.  
A second challenge to moral dilemma research is that of closed world assumptions—
assumptions contained within the dilemma itself that participants must assume to be true 
in order to answer the dilemma in a realistic manner (see Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 
2010). For example, the footbridge dilemma entails the assumption that pushing a person 
in front of a train will stop the train, and the torture dilemma entails the assumption that 
torture will result in effective actionable intelligence. If participants disagree with these 
assumptions, then the a priori logic of the dilemmas breaks down. For example, if 
participants believe that torture does not lead to accurate intelligence, then both 
deontology and utilitarianism should lead to judgments to avoid torture even when high 
explosives will kill people. Process dissociation improves the methodological resolution 
THE PROCESS DISSOCIATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT 106 
 
for examining the processes leading the moral judgments, but it cannot resolve the issue 
regarding closed world assumptions, which is endemic to all moral dilemma research.  
Third, there is a concern regarding the structure of moral dilemmas. Note that in all high-
conflict/incongruent scenarios described in this paper and in other work, the utilitarian 
option entails acting in order to cause harm, whereas the deontological option entails 
refraining from action. Several studies have identified action/omission as one dimension 
that impacts responses on moral dilemmas (e.g., Petrinovich & O‘Neill, 1996), but they 
changed the wording of the question rather than the nature of the action. Navarette and 
colleagues (2011) did reverse the nature of the action, but only within the trolley 
paradigm itself, which other theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) argue does not pit strong 
deontological inclinations against utilitarian inclinations to the same degree that more 
emotionally evocative dilemmas do (e.g., footbridge dilemma). Moreover, all attempts to 
examine the role of action/omission suffer from the non-independence error, rendering it 
difficult to know which inclination is affected by action versus omission.  
Therefore, in most dilemma research, action is conflated with utilitarianism and inaction 
with deontology, and in the few cases that disentangle these processes still conflate more 
judgments with the processes leading to judgments. This state of affairs risks conflating 
cautious or risk-averse response strategies with deontological inclinations, and action-
oriented or risk-taking response strategies with utilitarian inclinations. It would be 
preferable if researchers counterbalanced a set of dilemmas in order to control for this 
confound, using process dissociation to determine which parameter (or whether both 
parameters) are affected by the action/omission distinction. In fact, Bertram Gawronski, 
Joel Armstrong, and I have resolved to do so. This is but one of several projects that have 
emerged out of the current project.   
Finally, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that examination of the relations between the 
moral dilemma parameters and individual difference variables relied upon self-report 
scales to determine the nature of these individual differences, and self-report measures 
have well-known downsides: recollection of relevant events may be biased (Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990), answers may shift due to contextual factors such as priming (Mussweiler, 
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& Strack, 1999), and systematic differences may occur depending on which particular 
measurement techniques are employed (e.g., Olson, Goffin, & Haynes, 2005). For 
example, Conway and Gawronski, Study 1 measured participants‘ moral identity using 
Aquino and Reed‘s (2002) moral identity measure. This measure presents participants 
with various moral terms, then asks them to indicate, for example, how important those 
traits are to themselves personally on a scale from not true of me to completely true of me. 
Another example: In Conway, Bartels, & Pizarro, Study 2, participants completed Devoe 
& Pfeffer‘s (2007) volunteerism scale, which presents several items asking participants to 
report how much they agree they would be willing to volunteer without pay on a scale 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Although such measures are often discussed as 
if they are directly tapping the construct of interest, this is not actually correct—rather, 
such measures are tapping self-perceptions of the degree to which one adheres to the 
construct of interest. In other words, the moral identity scale is really tapping self-
perceptions of one‘s moral identity, which may be biased in ways that make people feel 
good about their moral status (Epley & Dunning, 2001). Similarly, the volunteerism scale 
is tapping self-perceptions of the degree to which one would be willing to volunteer, 
rather than actual volunteering behavior; these will be different to the degree that people 
are inaccurate regarding their predictions of future behavior. Therefore, the findings 
linking deontology and utilitarianism to various individual-difference measures should be 
interpreted with caution—they may reflect correspondence between these constructs and 
self-perceptions without necessarily mapping onto actual behavior.  
That said, this criticism is limited to studies focused on the relation between the 
parameters and individual-difference variables; Conway and Gawronski Studies 2 and 3 
experimentally manipulated theoretically-relevant variables (cognitive load and photos of 
victims) and demonstrated predicted, unique effects of these manipulations on the 
relevant parameters. These findings corroborate those examining individual-differences, 
thereby increasing confidence that the parameters related to more than mere self-
perceptions. Finally, as discussed below, Peysakhovich, Conway, Greene, and Rand (in 
preparation) found that deontology uniquely predicted actual prosocial behavior using 
real money in economic games. This finding suggests that the predictive validity of the 
parameters extends beyond self-report scales to actual behavior. Future work will 
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hopefully continue to incorporate real behavioral measures in order to further increase 
confidence in the validity of the parameters.  
4.4 Future Directions  
Now that the present work has validated a process dissociation measure of deontological 
and utilitarian inclinations, this technique may be applied to a host of theoretical 
questions in the field.  
4.4.1 Gender Differences in Moral Judgments  
One of the questions process dissociation may shed light on is gender differences in 
moral judgments. Bartels and Pizarro (2011) found that male participants made more 
overt utilitarian judgments than female participants overall. Fumagalli et al. (2010) also 
found a gender difference in overt judgments, which they isolated to personal dilemmas 
only (those involving direct harm to the victim); they found no gender differences on 
impersonal dilemmas (those where harm is mechanically mediated) or non-moral 
dilemmas. However, as they measured overt judgments only, these findings are 
vulnerable to the non-independence error. Therefore, they might reflect increased 
utilitarian inclinations among men, increased deontological inclinations among women, 
or some combination thereof.  
Consistent with Gilligan‘s (1982) distinction between women‘s preference for an ethic of 
care as distinct from men‘s preference for an ethic of justice, Fumagalli and colleagues 
interpreted the gender difference in moral judgments as reflecting both processes:  
―Female moral reasoning seems directed to avoid harming other people, to place 
high value on social relationships and to fulfill other individuals‘ expectations. 
Conversely, male moral thought hinges on the abstract principles of justice and 
fairness and on an individualistic stance‖ (2010, p. 223).  
Yet, due to the non-independence error, techniques examining overt judgments cannot 
determine whether Fumagalli and colleagues‘ view is the best interpretation, or whether 
other interpretations better reflect the gender difference. Conversely, process dissociation 
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can distinguish whether gender differences result from increased utilitarian processing in 
men or reduced utilitarian processing in women, or increased deontological processing in 
women or decreased deontological processing in men—or some combination thereof.  
Indeed, Conway, Friesdorf, and Gawronski (in preparation) have conducted a mega-
analysis on all available process dissociation data sets (39 datasets, total N = 5990). Note 
that at this sample size, all effects are significant, but significance testing is no longer 
informative, so we rely instead on analysis of effect size. Overall, we replicated the 
finding that men make more overt utilitarian judgments than women, Cohen‘s d = -.54. 
However, a process dissociation analysis revealed this effect to be driven largely by 
women scoring higher than men on the deontology parameter, Cohen‘s d = .59. Although 
men also scored higher than women on the utilitarian parameter, this effect was 
considerably smaller, Cohen‘s d = -.10. Therefore, these findings provide improved 
support for Gilligan‘s (1982) contention that women experience stronger affective 
reactions to harm (an element of the ethic of care). These findings also support Gilligan‘s 
contention that men engage in more dispassionate, pragmatic moral reasoning (an ethic of 
justice) than women. Yet, the difference between men and women in terms of 
utilitarianism is smaller than the difference in terms of deontology, suggesting that much 
of the variance in overt judgments noted by Bartels and Pizarro (2011) and Fumagalli et 
al. (2010) was driven by gender differences in deontology. That said, these findings also 
suggest that there is considerable within-gender variability on both deontology and 
utilitarianism.  
4.4.2 The Role of Threat in Moral Judgments 
The current work, as well as the rest of the moral dilemma literature, corroborates the 
dual-process model suggesting that deontological judgments are driven primarily by 
negative affect resulting from an empathic response to the harm suffered by victims, 
whereas utilitarian judgments are driven primarily by cognitive evaluations of outcomes. 
Yet, researchers have assumed, rather than tested, whether the negative affect involved in 
deontological responses is truly other-directed. Granted, a wealth of findings (including 
Conway & Gawronski, Study 3) suggest that the imagining harm in more vivid fashion 
increases deontological judgments, consistent with the idea that making the victims‘ pain 
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more salient increases deontology. This suggests that the affect involved in deontology 
might be other-directed.  
Yet, consider that moral dilemmas essentially invite people to become ‗butchers‘ in the 
service of the greater good. The more vividly one imagines causing violent harm to 
another (albeit with good intentions), the more one may experience negative affect due to 
implications for the self. After all, people view harm they cause directly as worse than 
other kinds of harm (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006) and experience moral failings as 
threatening to the self (Blasi, 1980; Cameron & Payne, 2012). Therefore, imagining 
causing harm (i.e., making a utilitarian judgment) might threaten people‘s self-concept, 
eliciting negative emotions that motivate them to make a deontological judgment.  
If considering harm elicits negative affect due to self-threat, deontological judgments 
may increase either because threat increases deontological motivations or reduces 
utilitarian motivation. Whereas the first finding would corroborate the dual-process 
model—which posits the negative affect elicited by harm affects only deontological 
processing—the second finding would require a re-evaluation of the dual-process model, 
which posits that only deontology is strongly motivated by affect. I have planned five 
studies to investigate the role of threat to the self in moral dilemma judgments. Studies 1 
and 2 will prime self vs. other focus vs. control either explicitly (via a mirror vs. photos 
of victims, Phillips & Silvia, 2005) or implicitly (via subliminal priming of participants‘ 
own name vs. others‘ names, Silvia, 2012) as participants complete a moral dilemma 
battery (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). I expect to replicate my previous finding that the 
other-focus condition increases deontological judgments compared to the control 
condition—an effect driven by the deontological (but not utilitarian) process dissociation 
parameter. If deontological judgments are also driven by threat to the self, then 
deontological judgments ought to be higher in the self-focus condition as well—though it 
remains to be seen whether this difference will manifest on the deontological or 
utilitarian parameter when measured via process dissociation.  
If deontological inclinations are driven by threat to the self elicited by imagining causing 
harm, then reducing perceptions of self-threat via physical cleansing (Study 3) or self-
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affirmation (Study 4) should reduce deontological judgments. Cleansing oneself reduces 
shame and guilt produced by moral failings (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), so if causing 
harm is threatening to the self, then participants who have an opportunity to cleanse 
themselves with a hand wipe might make fewer deontological judgments compared to 
those who merely get to view the hand wipe. Study 4 will employ a self-affirmation 
manipulation known to reduce defensiveness to threatening information (Sherman, 
Nelson, & Steele, 2000) by increasing the salience of values that are central to a person‘s 
self-image (Steele, 1988). If self-affirmation reduces self-threat of harming someone, this 
manipulation should have a similar effect as cleansing in Study 3.  
Finally, Study 5 will examine whether threatening the self will increase deontological 
inclinations. Previous research has established that recalling previous immoral behavior 
threatens the moral self, which motivates an increase in moral striving to prove moral 
worth (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). These effects are limited, however, to the recall 
of recent, concrete behaviors (Conway & Peetz, 2012). If deontological moral judgments 
are driven purely by empathic reactions to suffering, then one‘s previous behavior ought 
to have no impact on judgments, as it is irrelevant to the degree of suffering experienced 
by the victim. Conversely, if deontological moral judgments are motivated by threat to 
the moral self, then the prior status of the moral self ought to influence the strength of 
deontological moral judgments. To examine this possibility, we will manipulate moral 
self-perceptions by asking participants to recall recent moral or immoral behavior (see 
Conway & Peetz, 2012) before they complete the moral dilemma battery. Together, these 
five studies should shed light on the role of threat to the self in moral judgments.  
4.4.3 Other Process Dissociation Projects 
In addition to clarifying gender differences and the role of self-threat in moral judgments, 
process dissociation has proven useful in clarifying the nature of other moral processing. 
For example, Wisneski, Conway, and Skitka (in preparation) found that deontology 
parameter correlated positively with a measure of individual differences in the tendency 
to moralize political positions (e.g., The Iraq War, Abortions). This suggests that people 
who are more likely to consider the moral implications of political policies also tend to 
viscerally react to the thought of harm. Conversely, there was a negative correlation 
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between the utilitarian parameter and individual differences in the tendency to moralize 
everyday life (e.g., lying to a friend, impure behavior). This suggests that people who are 
more likely to consider the moral implications of everyday behavior are also less likely to 
accept pragmatic moral trade-offs; perhaps they prefer to stick with moral principles or 
with their intuitions.  
Consistent with these considerations, Wisneski, Conway, and Skitka  found the 
deontology parameter positively correlated with the individualizing foundations (harm 
and fairness) but not the binding foundations (respect for authority, loyalty, and purity) of 
the moral foundations questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Conversely, 
utilitarianism was unrelated to any of the moral foundations except negatively related to 
purity. This suggests that people who care relatively more about harm and fairness tend 
to experience stronger inclinations to avoid causing harm. On the other hand, people who 
care relatively more about purity (e.g., avoiding drugs and sexual perversion) are most 
skeptical of utilitarian tradeoffs. These findings suggest that individual differences in 
moral inclinations are not relevant only in the artificial circumstances of moral dilemmas, 
but may relate to broader views, such as the moralization of politics or everyday life.  
In another project, Peysakhovich, Conway, Greene, and Rand (in preparation) used 
individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations to predict prosocial 
responses on economic games. Participants completed a dictator game, where they 
received a bonus ($3) and could give any portion of it to an anonymous person, who 
would have no control over the situation. Participants also completed the public goods 
game, where they were given a bonus ($3) and could donate any portion of that bonus to 
a communal pot, which would be doubled then shared by four players. Therefore, 
donations were beneficial for group outcomes, but detrimental for one‘s own outcomes. 
We recorded the amount participants donated across both games.  
Peysakhovich, Conway, Greene, and Rand found that the deontology parameter predicted 
cooperation on both types of economic games, whereas utilitarianism did not. These 
results held above and beyond gender and other control variables. This may be viewed as 
a conceptual replication of Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro (under review) Study 2, where 
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deontology predicted prosocial behavior in mundane contexts, such as offering ordinary 
assistance to another person. It may be that people who experience stronger affective 
reactions to harm are also more likely to experience empathy for others in need under 
ordinary circumstances, leading to more prosocial responses. In Conway, Bartels, and 
Pizarro, Study 2, utilitarianism also predicted prosocial responses in extreme 
circumstances. Therefore, perhaps if Peysakhovich and colleages ran an extreme version 
of the dictator game where people had absolute control over whether another person lives 
or dies, then utilitarianism might predict prosocial responses as well. Perhaps an 
experimentally-appropriate analogue of this situation may be created, allowing for an 
examination of this possibility.  
Another interesting study to consider would be a replication and extension of Conway 
and Gawronski, Study 3. In that study, participants who read dilemmas accompanied b y 
a photo of the individual victim of harm for each dilemma demonstrated increased 
deontological, but not utilitarian, inclinations, compared to a control group of participants 
who read dilemmas without photos. This finding fits with the dual process model, as it 
suggests that a focus on the single victim enhanced the salience of harm potentially dealt 
to that individual, which increased inclinations to avoid causing harm. However, the 
question remains what would occur if similar photos would be presented for other people 
in each dilemma, those who are about to suffer impending harm unless harm is instead 
dealt to the individual target. The dual-process model suggests that judgments favoring 
the five original victims are driven by cognitive evaluations of overall outcomes, whereas 
judgments favoring the single victim are driven by an affective reaction against causing 
harm. Would showing photos of the other victims enhance the salience of the harm they 
are about to suffer? Presumably it would. The question then is whether this process 
would lead to increased utilitarianism, decreased deontology, or perhaps some other 
pattern, such as both increased utilitarianism and deontology. If enhancing the salience of 
harm to the existing victims increases utilitarianism (without impacting deontology), this 
finding would provide the first evidence of a link between affect and utilitarianism—
thereby suggesting a revision to the existing dual-process model. Therefore, such a study 
might be very useful in further clarifying the nature of utilitarianism and deontology.  
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Finally, Bernhard, Conway, and Greene (in preparation) found a link between the 
deontology and utilitarian parameters and genetic variation in a gene related to oxytocin, 
a hormone involved in a wide variety of social behaviors (for a review, see Lee et al., 
2009).  This gene polymorphism (identified as rs237889) has three alleles: dominant G/G 
homozygous, mixed A/G heterozygous, and recessive A/A homozygous. The variants are 
linked to differential ability to detect the hormone oxytocin in the nervous system, a 
hormone involved in many social behaviors, such as maternal care (Bosch & Neumann, 
2012) and cooperation in economic games (Israel et al., 2009).   
Bernhard, Conway, and Greene found an interaction between parameter and genotype, 
such that that people with A/A alleles scored higher on deontology than people with A/G 
alleles, who, in turn, scored higher on deontology than people with G/G alleles. 
Utilitarianism showed the opposite pattern: people with G/G alleles scored higher on 
utilitarianism than people with A/G alleles, who, in turn, scored higher on utilitarianism 
than people with A/A alleles. These results held above and beyond gender. These 
findings suggest that individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations 
may be related to individual differences in genetic make-up. Moreover, the genetic and 
moral judgment perspectives mesh nicely: people with G/G allele genotypes are more 
prone to antisocial behavior (Pluijm, 2012), and also experience the lowest degree of 
deontological inclinations, reminiscent of people with antisocial personality traits in 
Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro, (under review) Study 1. Obviously, there is much more 
work to be done to clarify the genetic correlates of moral inclinations, but this study is a 
first step in this new direction. 
4.5 Summary 
In sum, this project expands and refines the study of human moral psychology by 
providing an important methodological and theoretical advance. One product of this work 
is a new tool to enable researchers to examine more fine-grained questions regarding the 
relations between their variables of interest and utilitarianism and deontology. Another 
outcome is increased insight into the nature of the constructs in play. The application of 
process dissociation to moral judgments has (a) revealed obscured relations between 
moral identity and deontological and utilitarian inclinations, (b) clarified that the two 
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inclinations are, indeed, statistically independent, with different contextual and 
correlational profiles corresponding to theoretical predictions, (c) clarified that the 
relation between moral judgment and antisocial personality traits are driven by reduced 
deontological inclinations, rather than increased utilitarian ones, and (d) indicated that 
both utilitarianism and deontology predict some elements of prosociality, consistent with 
philosophical perspectives. Therefore, the current work provides a methodological and 
theoretical advance that pushes the current state of knowledge regarding human moral 
psychology one step further.   
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